ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS
“Global Reporting from the Third World: The Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association, 1963-1974,” Critical Asian Studies, 51:2, 166-197 (Jan 2019).
Taomo Zhou and Hong Liu, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Southeast Asia,” in Weiping Wu and Mark W. Frazier eds., The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018), 610-629.
Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965,” The China Quarterly 221 (March 2015), pp. 208-228.
“China and the Thirtieth of September Movement,” Indonesia 98 (October 2014), pp. 29-58.
Translation in Bahasa Indonesia: “Tiongkok dan G30S,” in Kurasawa Aiko and Toshio Matsumura eds., G30S dan Asia—Dalam Bayang-bayang Perang Dingin (Jakarta: Kompas, 2016), 1-60.
Hong Liu and Taomo Zhou, “Bandung Humanism and A New Understanding of the Global South: An Introduction,” Critical Asian Studies, 51:2, 141-143 (Jan 2019).
“Huaqiao wenti de zhengzhi xuanwo: jiexi 1959-1962 nian Zhongguo dui Yindunixiya zhengce [The turbulences caused by the overseas Chinese issue: An analysis of Chinese policy towards Indonesia, 1959-1962],” Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu [Cold War International Studies] 9 (Summer 2010), pp. 155-174.
GLOBAL REPORTING FROM THE THIRD WORLD
Abstract: Originating from the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association (AAJA) promoted international collaboration among journalists in newly independent countries. Built on an inclusive foundation of peaceful co-existence, the AAJA contributed to the development of expansive global information networks, lively intellectual traffic, and rich visual arts among Afro-Asian nations. However, the cosmopolitanism of its early years was later undermined by the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia and a lack of cohesion among Afro-Asian nations. After the September Thirtieth Movement in Indonesia in 1965, the AAJA relocated to Beijing and was mobilized by the People’s Republic to promote its self-image as the leader of an embittered Third World’s battle against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. In the early 1970s, ideological fervor began abating in China. During this time, Mao’s reframing of the three worlds, which was based on developmental measurements, redirected the AAJA’s Third World discourse to issues of modernization until its quiet dissolution in 1974. The ideological shifts by the AAJA demonstrate the complex and often conflicted ways in which two important post-colonial states —Indonesia and China—conceptualized “the Third World” and formulated media representations during the Cold War.
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: SOUTHEAST ASIA
Abstract: This chapter examines the changing contours of China-Southeast Asia relations from the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the present. It consists of two parts: The first part presents a chronological historical overview of the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. During the Mao era (1949-1976), ideology had been the main driving force behind Chinese policy towards Southeast Asia. Since the launch of the “reform and opening-up” program by a new leadership under Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978, Sino-Southeast Asian relations have been mainly shaped by the economic interests and realpolitik calculations of different stakeholders, including the Chinese and Southeast Asian governments as well as major external powers such as the United States and Japan. The second part of this chapter discusses three major factors affecting this relationship: ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, South China Sea disputes, and increasingly complex trade and investment networks. The conclusion identifies a few currently debated issues and some future challenges, including the PRC’s “One Belt One Road” initiative and its efforts to project soft power.
AMBIVALENT ALLIANCE: CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA, 1960-1965
Abstract: From 1960 until 1965, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) built a remarkably cordial quasi alliance with the Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, however, the years between 1960 and 1965 were marked by two large waves of anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia. Although more than half a century has passed since these events, our understanding of Chinese foreign policy towards Indonesia during these turbulent years remains incomplete. In 2008, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives declassified for the first time documents produced during the years between 1961 and 1965. However, very recently in summer 2013, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives re-classified the main body of its collection. Through examining this body of fresh but currently inaccessible official records, this article aims to bridge the gap between scholarly works on the PRC’s diplomatic history and overseas Chinese history. By tracing the processes by which Chinese diplomats dealt with Sukarno, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or the PKI), this article argues that the ambivalent Chinese alliance with Indonesia was shaped by three disparate pressures which interacted and competed with one another: the strategic need to befriend Third World countries, ethnic ties to the Chinese in Indonesia and ideological commitment to the international communist movement.
CHINA AND THE THIRTIETH OF SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT [PDF]
TIONGKOK DAN G30S [PDF]
Abstract: There has been a lot of uncertainty around the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Indonesian politics immediately before and during the Thirtieth of September Movement (Gerakan 30 September). The Suharto regime made repeated, although unverified, accusations that Communist China was involved in the September Thirtieth Movement. Based on documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives and Chinese Communist Party Central Archives, this article demonstrates that, from late 1964 to September 1965, Beijing used much of its political leverage to push for a scenario that suited its best interests in Indonesia—an adamant leftist government led by Sukarno and the PKI jointly, with the right wing undermined or eliminated. But Beijing’s actual influence over the PKI and the turn of events in Indonesia in 1965 was limited. In his meeting with Mao Zedong on August 5, 1965, Aidit sketched out what he would do in a political scenario without Sukarno. The Mao-Aidit conversation is probably the best evidence we have obtained so far to indicate that Aidit was a conscious actor in the movement while Beijing’s influence was marginal. Beijing supported the proposal of the Fifth Force in order to help the pro-Sukarno forces (the PKI and the Indonesian Air Force) strengthen themselves against the right-wing elements in the Indonesian Army. However, all the arms deals were made on a government-to-government level rather than through inter–Communist Party channels and none of the light weapons offered by Beijing arrived in Indonesia prior to the September Thirtieth Movement.