

H-Diplo ROUNDTABLE XXIII-19

Taomo Zhou. *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. ISBN: 9781501739934 (hardcover, \$47.95)

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 INTRODUCTION BY LORENZ LÜTHI, MCGILL UNIVERSITY

Did the People's Republic of China (PRC) orchestrate the coup in Indonesia in 1965? Was it hence responsible for the subsequent deadly campaigns against the Chinese diaspora? In her groundbreaking book on Sino-Indonesian relations in the two immediate post-World War II decades, Taomo Zhou addresses these and other long-standing historiographical questions. By marrying diplomatic, migration, and social history, she weaves a rich tapestry of bilateral relations, Chinese diasporic history, and the parallel developments of decolonization and revolution. Based on massive research in multiple countries, *Migration in the Time of Revolution* resolves a number of historiographical questions that vexed observers at the time and have troubled historians since. In short, the PRC was barely involved in the coup in 1965, and the subsequent anti-Chinese campaign was the pinnacle of a long series of similar campaigns of suppression.

Indonesia's role in the regional and global Cold War has attracted scholarly attention for a long time, including that of several of the reviewers in this roundtable.¹ Many of the previous treatments focused on diplomatic relations or Indonesia's domestic affairs, with a particular interest in the 1965 coup.² Zhou applies a wide angle to Cold War Indonesia by including decolonization and revolution, internal developments within the fractious Chinese diaspora, migration to and from Indonesia, and the role of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. She thereby places her story as much in the somewhat neglected field of decolonization of Asia as in the Cold War paradigm. In many respects, her story is seminally tied to the issue of citizenship in the decolonizing Global South, and the political and socio-economic questions this question creates for new nation states with externally vulnerable and internally weak governments. Poignantly, many of the issues Zhou raises were central problems discussed at the mostly forgotten Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in the spring of 1947. The governing elites of newly decolonized or decolonizing countries who met in India were acutely aware of the problems they faced. Zhou's book forces us to accept them finally as central topics in our own historical research.

Zhou mined an admirably wide range of sources to write a book that brings together high-level politics and daily diasporic life. While the central archives in the PRC and Indonesia are difficult to access, she exploited government and private collections in mainland China, Taiwan, Indonesia, the United States, and the Netherlands. Moreover, she tracked down former diplomats, exiles, and other participants in the events for personal conversations, or interviewed their children. As a result, the book transports the reader from conferences in Chairman Mao Zedong's bedroom to the streets of Jakarta and back.

All four reviewers agree that Taomo Zhou's *Migration in the Time of Revolution* is a major contribution to the transnational history of Asia. The book's fusion of migration and diplomatic history sets new standards for transnational studies in the double context of regional migration since the nineteenth century and decolonization in Asia after World War II. Several

¹ Wu-Ling Chong, *Chinese Indonesians in post-Subarto Indonesia: democratisation and ethnic minorities* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2018). Vanessa Hearman, *Unmarked Graves: Death and Survival in the Anti-Communist Violence in East Java, Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2018). Bradley R Simpson, *Economists with guns: authoritarian development and U.S.-Indonesian relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

² Ragna Boden, *Die Grenzen der Weltmacht: sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Breznev* [The limits of global power: Soviet policy towards Indonesia from Stalin to Brezhnev] (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2006). Soe Tjen Marching, and Angus Nicholls, *The end of silence: accounts of the 1965 genocide in Indonesia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017). Max Lane, *Catastrophe in Indonesia* (London: Seagull Books, 2010). Katharine E. McGregor, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman, eds., *The Indonesian genocide of 1965: causes, dynamics and legacies* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). John Roosa, *Pretext for mass murder: the September 30th Movement and Suharto's coup d'état in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). John Roosa, *Buried histories: the anticommunist massacres of 1965-1966 in Indonesia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2020). Putu Oka Sukanta, *Breaking the silence: survivors speak about 1965-66 violence in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2014). See also footnote 1.

reviewers assert that future transnational historians of the region will need to conceive their projects at the intersection of multiple historiographical approaches.

Wu-Ling Ching identifies a number of important contributions the book makes to explain the violence against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the two decades after World War II. Historical prejudices towards the Chinese diaspora, rooted in Dutch colonial practices, provided the stage for much of the violence in the post-colonial period. The competition between the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan made the situation worse, as both intervened in Indonesian internal affairs by manipulating different factions within the diaspora, although Beijing generally was much less active in its clandestine activities than Taipei. Contemporaneous claims to the contrary, the PRC was hardly involved in the 1965 coup. And, finally, ethnic Chinese who migrated back to the mainland China, often by under duress, faced great political and socio-economic difficulties in their new lives.

Vanessa Hearman emphasizes the theme of migration as the book's main contribution, particularly since Taomo Zhou places her focused treatment of the two post-World War II decades in the stream of longer developments beforehand and afterwards. The Chinese diaspora in Indonesia, as it emerged since the late nineteenth century, was very heterogeneous in terms of class, politics, and socio-economic and cultural integration. Despite the PRC-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty of 1955, historical distrust and maltreatment did not abate, and hence convinced some in the diaspora to migrate to China even before the massive violence of 1965 that caused yet another wave of emigration to the PRC. After 1967, the remaining diaspora Chinese lived—and continues to live—politically and socially marginalized in Indonesia.

Stanislav Myšička places *Migration in the Time of Revolution* in the tradition of several important studies on Chinese migration and diaspora³, and lauds the book as a major contribution to the study of Sino-Indonesian relations in particular and of relations among newly decolonized countries in general. Despite official rhetoric at the time, relations among Asian nations were not necessarily friendly, and sometimes they were even exacerbated by the unfolding of the Cold War. Although Myšička praises the book's clear writing, its overall structure, and its important contributions to several interrelated fields, he believes that readers less familiar with Sino-Indonesian relations would have benefitted if the book had been placed in the larger historiographical context of migration studies in general.

Bradley Simpson echoes many of the praises of the other three reviewers, but also asserts that Taomo Zhou's work raises many new questions, particularly with regard to how the PKI positioned itself in relationship to the Chinese diaspora and to the anti-Chinese tendencies in Indonesia's domestic politics. Still, he emphasizes that *Migration in the Time of Revolution* is a model that offers "a methodological roadmap for historians elsewhere who are seeking to integrate diplomatic, social, and migration histories."

This well-researched and fast-paced book answers many open questions about Asia's regional and global Cold War. At the same time, it challenges historians of the region, decolonization, and international relations to leave their well-established safe zones and ask hard questions in their own research. How did citizenship affect bilateral relations in the decolonizing Global South, as for example in Sino-Vietnamese relations or Indian-African relations? How did revolution and the rise of a modern nation state challenge or fortify traditional ideas of belonging? And to what degree did decolonization, revolution, the Cold War, and other long-term historical developments intersect in Indonesia and other cases of internal violence? Taomo Zhou's *Migration in the Time of Revolution* provides us with several great points of departure in terms of inquiry and methodology.

Participants:

Taomo Zhou is Assistant Professor of History at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, specializing in modern Chinese and Southeast Asian history. Her writings have appeared in publications such as *The Journal of Asian Studies*,

³ See footnote 1 in his review.

Diplomatic History, *The China Quarterly*, *The Critical Asian Studies*, the journal *Indonesia*, and *The Made in China Journal*. Taomo's first book, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia and the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2019), is a *Foreign Affairs* "Best Books of 2020" and has received an Honorable Mention for the Harry J. Benda Prize from the Association of Asian Studies. Taomo is working on a new research project on Shenzhen—the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of China—and its connections with the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and free ports across Southeast Asia.

Lorenz Lüthi is Professor of History in International Relations at McGill University. His research focuses on the large and cross-continental developments of the Cold War. He published *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton University Press) in 2008 and *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge University Press) in 2020. His current research focuses on Berlin in the Cold War.

Wu-Ling Chong is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. Her areas of expertise include ethnic Chinese studies and Southeast Asian politics. She is the author of *Chinese Indonesians in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Democratisation and Ethnic Minorities* (Hong Kong University Press, 2018). The book explores the role of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in shaping the democratisation process as well as their position in post-Suharto Indonesia across business, politics, and civil society. Wu-Ling has also published articles and book reviews in *Asian Ethnicity*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Southeast Asian Studies*, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (JSEAS), *JATI—Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, *Sejarah*, *Sarjana*, and *Borneo Research Journal* (BRJ).

Vannessa Hearman is Senior Lecturer in History at Curtin University, Western Australia. A historian of Southeast Asia, she is the author of the book *Unmarked Graves: Death and Survival in the Anti-Communist Killings in East Java, Indonesia* (NUS Press, 2018). The book won the inaugural Asian Studies Association of Australia's Early Career Book Prize. Her research deals with the Indonesian 1965-66 anti-communist violence, the politics of memory and human rights, and transnational activism related to Indonesia and East Timor/Timor-Leste. She is currently researching the history of East Timorese migration to Australia as part of a project funded by the Australian Research Council (SR200201031).

Stanislav Myšička, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic. His specialization is modern Chinese history, China's domestic politics, and international relations in Asia. His most recent published research focuses on the theory of offensive realism in relation to China's rise in international politics (in *Pacific Focus*).

Bradley Simpson is Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of Connecticut and the author of *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008). He is currently writing a global history of the idea of self-determination in international politics.

REVIEW BY WU-LING CHONG, UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA

Taomo Zhou's *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War* is a welcome and significant addition to the literature on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. In general, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are different from Chinese minorities in other countries because, as Gungwu Wang notes, "For whatever understandable reasons, nowhere have more Overseas Chinese been killed or wounded, run away or been chased away, and been so insecure during the past twenty years [1950s-1970s] than in Indonesia."⁴ Although Wang made the remark in 1976, it is still applicable to the Chinese minority in Indonesia after the 1970s as massive anti-Chinese violence continued throughout the country and reached its climax in May 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis that brought significant damage to the Indonesian economy. Although massive anti-Chinese violence declined significantly after the end of Suharto's authoritarian rule, prejudice and hostility against the Chinese are still deeply-rooted among many indigenous Indonesians as they still perceive Chinese Indonesians as an alien minority group that dominates the economy of the country. This is because although not all Chinese Indonesians are wealthy, the economic condition of Chinese Indonesians in general is relatively better than that of indigenous Indonesians.⁵ In addition, as Yew-Foong Hui points out, due to their ancestral ties with China, Chinese Indonesians are generally still perceived as "strangers at home" in Indonesia.⁶

This book examines governmental relations between Jakarta and Beijing after the Second World War until mid-1960s when the Cold War reached its climax from the perspective of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. By referring to government sources in both China and Indonesia, as well as other relevant archival sources and individual interviews, Zhou sheds much-needed light on how the political battle between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists greatly influenced the loyalty of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia from the end of the Second World War until mid-1960s. The first four chapters examine in detail the influence of the Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the diplomatic battle between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was dominated by the Chinese Nationalist Party and CCP respectively, and the communal battle between the pro-ROC and pro-CCP Chinese in Indonesia. The fifth and sixth chapters focus on the generally negative perceptions of the *pribumi*, or indigenous Indonesians, towards the Chinese in Indonesia and anti-Chinese violence that broke out in the country in 1959-1960. The following three chapters explore in detail the ambivalent and complicated relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Jakarta as well as Beijing's role in the September 30th Movement that involved an abortive Communist coup. The stories of Chinese migrants who 'returned' to the PRC from Indonesia between the early 1950s and mid-1960s are the central theme of the tenth chapter. The last chapter contains the conclusion of this study.

In my view, there are five important findings in this book. First, violence against the Chinese during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949) was due to not only the *pribumi*'s long-standing prejudice that linked the Chinese as collaborators of the Dutch colonizers but also the Chinese Nationalist government's disdainful attitude towards Indonesia's anticolonial struggle and its moral support for *Pao An Tui*, a self-defence organization formed by ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. *Pao An Tui* aroused distrust and hostility from the *pribumi* because it received assistance and weapons from the Dutch. Hence, the Chinese Nationalist government's moral support for the organization only further perpetuated the *pribumi*'s prejudice towards the Chinese.

⁴ Gungwu Wang, "Are Indonesian Chinese Unique?: Some Observations," in *The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays*, ed. J.A.C. Mackie (West Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1976), 204.

⁵ For more details of negative prejudice against Chinese Indonesians in post-Suharto Indonesia, see Charlotte Setijadi, "Chinese Indonesians in the Eyes of the *Pribumi* Public," *ISEAS Perspective* 73 (September 27, 2017): 1-12. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_73.pdf.

⁶ Yew-Foong Hui, *Strangers at Home: History and Subjectivity among the Chinese Communities of West Kalimantan* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

Second, in the early 1950s, not long after Indonesia achieved independence, the Chinese Nationalist Party's Jakarta branch actually encouraged the pro-ROC Chinese in Indonesia "to take Indonesian citizenship as a formality, so that they would be entitled to rights unavailable to noncitizen Chinese and be able to help promote pro-ROC education, expand pro-ROC ethnic Chinese associations, and boycott citizenship registration at the PRC embassy and consulates" (62). Based on records in the archives of Academia Historica, Taiwan's state-funded museum that keeps official records related to Taiwanese history, and primary sources published in China, Zhou points out that some pro-ROC Chinese who had been granted Indonesian citizenship even became agents for the ROC government and infiltrated Indonesian governmental departments. But such covert attempts to influence Indonesian politics were later met with a backlash after a new cabinet dominated by left-wing Indonesian politicians was formed in 1953 and a few pro-ROC Chinese were arrested on charges of violating peace and order in Indonesia. This is a very important finding about the involvement of the pro-ROC Chinese in Indonesian politics in the early 1950s.

Third, the ideological division between the ROC and PRC significantly influenced and shaped the social and political lives of the *totok* Chinese, who were Chinese with a strong ethnic identity, in Indonesia in the 1950s. Zhou examines extensively the communal battle between the pro-ROC and pro-PRC Chinese in Jakarta in the 1950s. The communal battle took place not only in Chinese-language presses and Chinese civic associations but also Chinese-medium schools. This issue is also examined in Hui's book, but Hui focuses on the case in West Kalimantan instead.⁷ Hence, Zhou's findings and analysis complement Hui's study.

Fourth, the PRC was not involved in the September 30th Movement as the Suharto regime claimed. Based on the records in the Chinese Communist Party Central Archives, and also on the fact that the military aid that the PRC provided to Indonesia in the 1960s was much less significant than the aid provided by the Soviet Union and the United States, Zhou emphasizes that the PRC did not, as the Suharto regime claimed, get involved in the Movement by instructing Dipa Nusantara Aidit (hereafter Aidit), the chairperson of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), to topple Sukarno by launching a coup or provide weapons to PKI. The records show that Aidit was the one who played an active role in initiating the Movement, together with some left-wing military officers, without alerting other PKI members. This finding is consistent with that of John Roosa's study on the Movement based on archival sources in Indonesia, the United States and the Netherlands.⁸

Fifth, Chinese migrants who 'returned' to the PRC from Indonesia during the two-decade span of this study generally lived tough lives in their ancestral homeland. This was due to, on the one hand, the returnees' difficulties in adapting to the planned economy under the socialist system in the PRC, and on the other hand, the suspicion of the Communist regime towards the returnees as "subversive" elements" due to their foreign (read: Indonesian) ties and capitalistic behavior (199). Zhou's description of the life stories of the returnee Chinese in the PRC in the tenth chapter vividly illustrates their dilemma in the 1950s and 1960s; they were treated as 'strangers' or 'aliens' in both Indonesia and the PRC.

Zhou also points out that since most of the returnee Chinese had formerly engaged in business when they had been in Indonesia, they carried with them their business practices after moving to the PRC. After the PRC began to adopt a market-based economy under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, coastal South China, the area where most returnees had been resettled, "was at the forefront of China's economic reform and opening up to the world in the late 1970s" (210). To my knowledge, the role of the returnee Chinese in the economic reforms of the PRC is still understudied. Hence, future research could explore this area in more detail.

⁷ Hui, *Strangers at Home*, 73-92.

⁸ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

Overall, this is a well-written book in terms of both empirical richness and relevance to understanding migration and political activism of Chinese in Indonesia during the Cold War. It will be a valuable reference for future research on not only ethnic Chinese in Indonesia but also returnee Chinese in the PRC.

REVIEW BY VANNESSA HEARMAN, CURTIN UNIVERSITY

In the mid-twentieth century, approximately 2.5 million ethnic Chinese, making up the largest percentage of foreign nationals, lived in Indonesia. Through oral history interviews and archives located in several countries, Taomo Zhou examines how Chinese Indonesians dealt with the Cold War and heightening political mobilisations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Indonesia in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Building upon earlier scholarly works on Chinese Indonesians, such as by G. William Skinner, Charles A Coppel, J.A.C. Mackie, and Leo Suryadinata, the author makes new, original findings about the political and social situation confronting Chinese Indonesians from 1945 to 1967 by also bringing in insights from recent innovative works on Indonesian political history, and Cold War- and diaspora studies.⁹ According to Zhou, on one hand, the PRC and Indonesia were connected by “a strategic alignment built on a shared past of anticolonial struggle and an anticipated future of independence from the Cold War superpowers” (3). On the other hand, the two countries were linked socially through the presence of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, a group who had economic influence but “an unclear citizenship status” (3). Zhou's book deals with how the changing global political situation and state-to-state relations impacted those at the grassroots level. In this way, the book simultaneously contributes to diplomatic history and migration studies, bringing these two fields into a highly productive interaction to deepen our understanding on the relationship between diplomacy and grassroots politics.

As a book about migration, its central theme is mobility in the twentieth century, largely focusing on Chinese Indonesians and their experiences of migration, displacement, and forced exile. In examining travel and individual experiences, starting with the development of a Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia itself, Zhou then examines how the region became home to Chinese economic and political migrants. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activists, such as Ba Ren, who went on to become the first PRC ambassador to Indonesia, undertook politically motivated, and at times clandestine, travel to the region to build support for the party and seek refuge from the Japanese occupation. Such travel resulted in a greater understanding on the part of some future PRC leaders of the Indonesian context and shaped their outlook on how the ethnic Chinese should relate to the Indonesian independence struggle subsequently.

Zhou outlines how the Dutch policies of separately classifying the Chinese in the East Indies as Foreign Orientals influenced Chinese racial identity and how the Chinese viewed their relationship to Indonesia. Broadly divided between the *peranakan* and the *totok* in cultural terms, the Chinese in Indonesia took an interest in political developments in China and the Dutch East Indies but were themselves diverse in terms of class, language, political outlook, and orientation to China. Zhou defines the *peranakan* as the “Indonesian-born, locally rooted ethnic Chinese who use bahasa Indonesia or a regional Indonesian language as their primary language,” and includes “descendants of mixed-race unions,” while the *totok* were “foreign-born immigrants and their descendants who continue to speak Mandarin and Chinese dialects such as Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, and Teochew” (6). This introductory section on the characteristics of the Chinese Indonesian communities sets the scene for the next section of the book on how this diverse group of people regarded the prospect of an independent Indonesia, following the surrender of the Japanese in the Second World War and Indonesia's 1945 independence declaration.

In her book, Zhou outlines how the ethnic Chinese were divided in their attitudes towards such a prospect, with some choosing to side with the Dutch during the Indonesian War for Independence (1945-1949). The civil war between the

⁹ G. William Skinner, “The Chinese Minority,” in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia*, (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), Charles A. Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), J.A.C. Mackie and Charles A. Coppel, “A Preliminary Survey,” in J. A. C. Mackie, ed., *The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays*, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1976), Leo Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesian, the Chinese Minority, and China*, 3rd ed. (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1992), Hong Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949–1965* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), Madeline Y. Hsu, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

Nationalists and the Communists in China, and the founding of the PRC in 1949 and of Chinese Taipei led to a political polarisation among the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Given their already diverse political views and class positions, and thanks to lobbying by both Chinas, the Chinese in Indonesia became divided between the (red) pro-PRC and the (blue) pro-Taipei camps. However, there were also those, such as members of the organisation Baperki (*Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia*, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship), who encouraged the Chinese to adopt what Siauw Tiong Djin characterises as “Indonesia-oriented politics and...to regard Indonesia as their motherland.”¹⁰ Many Chinese were also apolitical, however, and appeared to be more concerned with avoiding being scapegoated on racial or political grounds.

As newly founded states, the PRC and the Republic of Indonesia had to grapple with questions of the identity, belonging, and citizenship of the Chinese in Indonesia. The 1955 Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, requiring active self-declarations by heads of households as a method for choosing citizenship precipitated debates among ethnic Chinese leaders (75), and never satisfied the doubters who questioned their loyalty to the new nation-state. The status of Chinese Indonesians was important in shaping the relationship between the PRC and Indonesia and in influencing domestic politics. By 1960, the PRC felt secure in the knowledge that Taipei was firmly out of favour with President Sukarno’s government, after evidence came to light that it had supported anti-Sukarno movements in Indonesia’s Outer Islands Rebellion. Right wing Indonesians were concerned of Communist infiltration by Beijing through the political and social organisations of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (113). Cold War inflected attitudes, therefore, were reflected on the international stage and domestically.

Challenging the idea that individuals are simply subjected to the winds of change occurring at the top, however, Zhou consistently shows the role of individual agency and of autonomous organising in communities and groups to create new opportunities. Although suspicions over their political loyalty, underpinned by racist attitudes held by many Indonesians, made life difficult for the Chinese in Indonesia, activism from below constrained the possible actions open to governments. Despite the PRC’s desire to remain restrained and careful about how it related to local developments in Indonesia in the early 1950s in the desire for peace in its external relations, the resentment of the Chinese at their systematic mistreatment by the Indonesian government and anti-Chinese Indonesians meant that the PRC was far from being in control of the Chinese in Indonesia. Two government decrees in 1959-1960 prohibited the Chinese from carrying out business and residing in the rural areas, resulting in their influx into the cities. Some chose to leave Indonesia for the PRC. In areas where the Chinese were numerous and strongly organised such as in Medan and West Kalimantan, they fought to preserve some autonomy. In Medan in 1963, for example, mourners refused to comply with local authorities who demanded the disbanding of a memorial meeting for the victims of anti-Chinese riots in West Java (125). The Chinese attempted to deal actively with a situation of flux, refusing to simply be subjected to the vagaries of power, which was wielded in their case by several governments and hostile societal forces.

A strength of Zhou’s book lies in her access to, and careful examination of, PRC archives, which provide us with insights into how the country’s leaders and diplomats regarded Indonesia and its key political actors, such as Sukarno, and Dipa Nusantara Aidit, the chairperson of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI). Such assessments were made in order to gauge the extent to which these allies could further the PKI’s vision of world revolution, while at the same time, avoiding the PRC becoming directly involved in risky ventures such as Sukarno’s Confrontation with Malaysia (143). In these archives, Zhou discovered the record of conversation in August 1965 between Aidit and Mao Zedong, CCP chairman, in which Aidit informed him that the the PKI was planning a body not dissimilar to what became the Thirtieth September Movement, namely a military-led special committee to deal with the right-wing leadership of the Indonesian army (161). The extent and nature of PKI involvement in this Movement, discussed further below, has been the subject of

¹⁰ Siauw Tiong-Djin, *Siauw Giok Tjhan: Bicultural leader in Emerging Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2018), 235.

decades of scholarly debate; therefore, Zhou's contribution is a welcome one.¹¹ The book also explains in more detail the positions taken within the CCP itself, such as by PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, and President Liu Shaoqi towards Indonesia, which was their key ally at a time when both countries were forced to deal with the rise of non-alignment and the waning of Afro-Asianism. Zhou's archival research and her careful, yet incisive analysis are nothing short of transformative in this field of history.

In Indonesia, the abduction and murder of six army generals and a lieutenant by the Thirtieth September Movement in 1965 became the pretext for the destruction of the PKI in the mass violence led by Major General Suharto. The Movement was portrayed as a PKI coup with full PRC involvement. In response to attacks on the PRC's embassy in Jakarta, which were carried out by pro-Army students, the Red Guards attacked Indonesian diplomatic facilities in China. Zhou argues that domestic political mobilisations in Indonesia and in the PRC in the mid-to-late 1960s contributed to a complete breakdown in official bilateral relations and a great deal of human suffering. Longstanding Indonesian anti-Chinese sentiments, regardless of whether the sympathies of the Chinese lay with the PRC or not, led to the ethnic Chinese being scapegoated for their supposed Communist allegiance. To Taipei's dismay, little differentiation was made between the PRC and the Republic of China. With some making the decision to abandon Indonesia for the PRC, the cycle of anti-Chinese policies resumed, leading to migration to the so-called motherland.

As a Chinese Indonesian by birth and upbringing myself, I found that Zhou's book reflected the experiences of my own extended family. Growing up in Malang, East Java in the early 1980s, I recall that our family would gather whenever a letter with spidery handwriting bearing a Hong Kong postmark arrived in the mail from my great aunt, Tan Kee Nio. Born in East Java, Nio departed for the PRC sometime in the late 1950s with her husband and six children. Like many of the "returnees" who are discussed in Zhou's book (206), they were shocked at the conditions they found in the socialist motherland and at having to carry out agricultural work, a far cry from their former, prosperous life in Ambulu, East Java, as Nio wrote in her letters to the relatives left behind in Indonesia.

Indonesian "returnees" found it difficult to settle in the southern provinces, despite the propaganda they were subjected to aboard the evacuation ship sent from the PRC, the *Guanghua* (187), as Zhou describes. Through fascinating fieldwork and archival research, she shows us how the Indonesians continued to exercise agency, however, by speaking out and writing about their poor living conditions and refusing to comply with many of their hosts' expectations about how they should live in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution. From the point of view of the CCP cadres and local officials, these Nanyang Chinese possessed too many bourgeois values and too much of a free spirit. Yet the entrepreneurial character and non-conforming nature of these 'returnees' in southern China contributed to the success of the PRC's turn to market reforms in the Deng Xiaoping era and beyond.

Unlike his sister, Nio, my grandfather, Tan Hay Liong refused to even entertain the idea of migrating to the PRC. A successful *peranakan* businessman who was born and raised in East Java, he could not see his children being able to settle into a society with rigid rules and little individual freedom. He maintained his view, even as, following the Thirtieth September Movement, he was forced to burn his books for fear of being castigated as a Communist sympathiser. As diplomatic relations were frozen between Indonesia and the PRC from 1967, our family was forced to keep secret my great aunt Nio's letters, even if they had been carefully posted to us from Hong Kong.

While the book focuses on the period up to 1967, when diplomatic relations broke down following accusations of the PRC's orchestration of the Thirtieth September Movement, as Zhou writes in the conclusion of the book, the marginal status of the ethnic Chinese has continued even beyond the Suharto regime. Governments in Indonesia in the democratic era have failed to deliver greater equality. The anti-Chinese violence that accompanied the regime's ouster in May 1998, which included property damage and sexual assault, has been met with impunity. More gravely, as Jemma Purdey argues, far from

¹¹ These debates are canvassed in John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 62.

anti-Chinese violence being state led, the continued uncertainty of the status of Chinese Indonesians shows that “anti-Chinese sentiments and antipathies,” as well as memories of past violence, are deeply embedded in Indonesian society.¹² This book sheds light on the roots of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia by examining twentieth-century history from a transnational perspective. Deeply humanistic, it examines how passion, emotion, and idealism animated state-to-state relations in the Cold War, not least as a result of the actions of individual migrants, refugees and exiles. With its vast scope and meticulous detail, scholars of Asian and world history, migration studies, and international relations will be well served in the years to come by this ground-breaking book.

¹²Jemma Purdey, “Anti-Chinese Violence and Transitions in Indonesia,” in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker, eds., *Chinese Indonesians: Remembering, Distorting and Forgetting* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 34.

REVIEW BY STANISLAV MYŠIČKA, UNIVERSITY OF HRADEC KRÁLOVÉ

In the past decades a significant amount of works have been published that explained and analyzed various aspects, general or particular, of matters related to past and present Chinese migration and the lives of the overseas Chinese.¹³ What is especially fruitful about this body of research is that migration played, and in increasing fashion plays, a bigger role in areas that are traditionally understood as being firmly in the hands of the state, especially foreign policy.¹⁴ Migration and overseas communities are inherently transnational phenomena, and thus always had profound influence on both foreign policy and the nation building process. Nowhere else than in modern China is this process in various ways strongly articulated.

The book under review tackles a very important yet understudied topic of the relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese diaspora abroad, whose existence in many instances predates the existence of Communist China by centuries. This book also sheds light on the more general subject of relations among formerly colonized countries throughout the Cold War, which were far from monolithic and friendly, despite the prevalent official rhetoric. The relations between Indonesia and the PRC represent an interesting case, where long-term inter-ethnic relations in Indonesia involving an ethnic Chinese minority were heavily influenced by international diplomacy and the changing ideological landscape of the Cold War. Focusing on the role of social actors in diplomacy such as overseas communities, instead of identifying diplomacy only with elite actors, helps us to better understand foreign relations during the Cold War. Of crucial interest in *Migration in the Times of Revolution* are not only the relations of the Chinese diaspora with the Indonesian government (and society in general) before and after independence, but also their treatment by their country of origin from 1949 until the late 1960s.

We can identify several key narratives of Taomo Zhou's book. The Chinese minority in Indonesia was not monolithic, but there was a significant fault-line concerning pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist political orientation. Furthermore, there was an ambivalent attitude of the PRC's government towards its compatriots in Indonesia, fluctuating between praise of their patriotism and criticism of their bourgeois way of life. On the other hand, despite Indonesia's official ideology of national self-determination, social and racial equality, political practices in Indonesia significantly differed and heavily involved discriminatory measures against the Chinese minority. As with other countries in South East Asia with large Chinese minorities, the PRC on many occasions scaled down its official relations with organizations of ethnic Chinese and scaled down its direct involvement in Indonesian politics for the goal of improving bilateral relations with Indonesia.

The narrative starts with an overview of the struggle between the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over their influence on the overseas Chinese in Indonesia at the time of nascent Indonesian independence (Chapters 1-2). Ethnic Chinese were caught up in the spiral of violence engulfing Indonesia from 1945–1949 and were attacked on numerous occasions for being associated with the old colonial system and because they were seen as unjustly overrepresented in commerce. The situation within the Chinese community in Indonesia was further complicated by the ongoing struggle of the Civil War in China in the same period. Both the Nationalist government after 1927 as well as the CCP in the pre-PRC period used the overseas Chinese as a political tool. Furthermore, during the late 1940s, we see the emergence of open

¹³ See for example Glen Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Evelyn Hu DeHart, ed., *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999); Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001); Frank N. Pieke, Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø, and Antonella Ceccagno, *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Madeline Y. Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and South China, 1882–1943* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

¹⁴ For a representative research of this sort see Wang, Gungwu, "China and Southeast Asia," in David Shambaugh, ed., *Power Shift. China and Asia's New Dynamic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); David Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

criticism of the perceived lack of any attempt by the Chinese government to alleviate the plight of Chinese overseas communities. For another several decades, the Chinese government was accused of neglecting overseas Chinese, even though they were loyal to the national cause, not only in Indonesia but in other countries in the region as well.

Chapters Three and Four are dedicated to further analysis of the struggle between Taiwan and Communist China over the influence over the Chinese in Indonesia, with both using diplomacy, economic leverage, cultural policies, and public diplomacy. Indonesia was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC in 1950; however, its relations with Beijing remained ambivalent. That changed in the second half of the 1950s, when the Indonesian government turned more to the political left. Interestingly, that in turn led to the gradual diminishing of official contacts between overseas Chinese Communists and the Chinese government, a move that was seen as a necessary diplomatic step to normalize Beijing's relations with Indonesia after the 1955 Bandung conference. Nevertheless, the overseas Chinese in Indonesia were still seen as either economic exploiters or elements with suspicious political allegiance. Chapter Six maps out the various ways the Indonesian government worked to more tightly exercise control over the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia and shows the pervasive negative attitude towards the ethnic Chinese by a significant part of the Indonesian government and the military.

Long-term popular and official distrust of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia resulted in the Sino-Indonesian crisis of 1959-1960, which primarily resulted in the tighter regulation of ethnic Chinese economic activities in Indonesia (Chapter 7). Around 100,000 Chinese left for the PRC, even though in diplomatic terms the PRC's reaction was muted. Intensifying the pressure on Chinese in Indonesia was chiefly result of complicated domestic political situation, when Sukarno had to balance both left- and right-wing political forces. The PRC's attempt to repatriate a larger number of Chinese from Indonesia shortly afterward faced financial difficulties, which were exacerbated by the devastating impact of the Great Leap Forward on the Chinese economy. While the steps taken by the Indonesian government significantly worsened the economic situation of many ethnic Chinese, the PRC intentionally ultimately ended its repatriation program in order to keep the two nations on good terms. During 1962-1965, the Sino-Indonesian relations improved markedly, largely due to Sukarno's need for political allies in his domestic struggles and the Chinese view that he still was one of the champions of anti-imperialism in Asia. Mao Zedong saw Indonesia as a crucial piece of the so-called "intermediate zone."¹⁵ China and Indonesia supported each other economically, diplomatically, and politically, but their relations still remained geopolitically ambivalent. That can be clearly seen in the case of Sukarno's *konfrontasi* campaign against Malaysia, which was supported by Beijing, but that stopped short of directly involving the People's Liberation Army or Chinese minorities in Indonesia, Singapore, or Malaysia.¹⁶ Beijing provided some military aid, but refused many Indonesian demands for better training, military equipment, or the direct involvement of Chinese military personnel. Nevertheless, Indonesia came closer to more aggressive form of anti-imperialism that was typical of Maoist China at the time. Before the ousting of Sukarno, China and Indonesia drew closer, but they had to pay the cost of estranging not only the West and the Soviets, but also many of the non-aligned countries as well.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center, eds., *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 387–389. For the evolution of Chinese foreign policy under Mao see Jian Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

¹⁶ *Konfrontasi* is analyzed by Boon Khenk Chea, "The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948–1960: Contesting the State and National Change," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11: 1 (2009): 132–152; C. C. Chin, "Re-examining the 1948 Revolt of the Malayan Communist Party in Malaya," *Kajian Malaysia* 27: 1-2 (2010): 11–38.

¹⁷ I should add that the early 1960s were on the one hand time of full scale Sino-Soviet split, on the other hand the PRC wanted to have much bigger influence over socialist revolutions in the Third World, see Niu Jun, *1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy* (CWIHP working paper no. 48. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2005); Danhui

Any such further Sino-Indonesian bilateral improvements were halted by one of the most important events in modern Sino-Indonesian relations, the abortive September 30th movement and subsequent establishment of Suharto's regime along with wide scale atrocities against alleged sympathizers, including many ethnic Chinese (Chapter 8). New evidence presented by Zhou shows that Beijing did not have information about the critical condition of Sukarno's health and that it was not directly involved in either planning or the execution of the coup. She subsequently supports this argument by pointing to the general Chinese foreign policy goals at the time, which were to use Indonesia to weaken Western influence in South Asia, not to foment a Communist revolution on the archipelago. Even though the CCP and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) grew significantly closer during the early 1960s, it was never Communist China's plan to use the PKI as a force for overturning the Sukarno government.

Interestingly, the political turmoil surrounding the beginning of the Suharto regime saw a new round of Beijing-Taipei competition over the influence in Indonesia (Chapter 9). Growing attacks on Chinese diplomatic targets by paramilitary groups in Indonesia, which were supported by the government, significantly worsened bilateral relations, which had already been badly damaged by the September 30 events, and contributed to the mobilization in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution. The heightening tensions between Jakarta and Beijing finally culminated in the freezing the diplomatic relations in October 1967. However, Taipei's hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough came to naught, because Indonesia did not want to completely cease diplomatic relations with the PRC, citing the large number of ethnic Chinese with PRC sympathies who were still living in Indonesia and its very important economic relations with Communist China. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik even announced in his capacity as UN General Assembly president that the PRC would replace Taiwan in the UN Security Council. Especially interesting in this chapter is the author's depiction of how immigrants from Indonesia were immediately integrated into the complicated ideological and factional battles of the Cultural Revolution (187-190).¹⁸

Chapter Ten looks at the life of ethnic Chinese migrants from Indonesia who came to the PRC between 1949 and the late 1960s. It shows how the experience of many of those who emigrated were vastly different from their initial expectations because of the sharp disparity in the living conditions and lifestyles of the two countries. That represented a crucial challenge to the officials who were responsible for integrating incoming ethnic Chinese to the new realities of newly socialist China. Initially, PRC authorities were very keen to use the ethnic Chinese diaspora as an important source of foreign currency that would flow back the country through remittances while China was under heavy international embargo because of its participation in the Korean War. Immigrant ethnic Chinese were very not heavily pressured to change their ways of life in many respects, even though they still had to accustom themselves to the harsh economic reality of Chinese planned economy. Nevertheless, with the radicalization of the domestic political atmosphere within the PRC, that policy changed significantly in the late 1950s. Significant change to the class status of the settled Chinese migrants from Indonesia occurred, changing from mostly moderate to much more unfavorable ("landlords" and "subversive elements") (198-199). Especially troublesome was the government's policy of relocating most of the incoming Chinese from Indonesia to perform rural labor, mostly in south and southeastern China. The dissatisfaction of a significant number of returnees from Indonesia shows that the PRC's attempt at integrating them into the collectivized rural economy was at best partially successful.

Zhou's book is a well-written, structured, and articulated book that enriches our understanding of Cold War history in Asia, foreign relations between decolonized countries, and the complex relations between Communist China and the overseas Chinese community. *Migration in the Times of Revolution* utilizes a great number of primary sources to support its key arguments, including a plethora of official documents, local journals, newspapers, and many interviews with a number of ethnic Chinese who relocated from Indonesia to the PRC. The book further shows some of the alternative ways of how we

Li and Yafeng Xia, "Jockeying for Leadership. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961 – July 1964," *Cold War History* 14:1 (2014): 24–60.

¹⁸ This is an interesting aspect of the Cultural Revolution, which is not well researched in the literature. For the implications of the Cultural revolution on PRC's foreign relations see for example Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Shoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), 308–336.

can expand our knowledge of diplomacy and foreign relations during the Cold War, utilizing analyses of understudied phenomena that are still highly relevant. Even though it is not the main subject of research interest of the book, Zhou also sheds more light on the complex issue of creating and sustaining Chinese national identity. A large number of ethnic Chinese living abroad around the world (some of them for centuries) will always remain in ambivalent position to the narratives created on the mainland because they are necessarily part of local communities in many ways and thus never neatly part of the Chinese nation as it is understood in China proper. As is very nicely captured by *Migration in the Times of Revolution*, the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia was deemed foreign not only by the majority of Indonesian society (keeping in mind that Chinese in Indonesia were never a homogenous group), but at least partially also by the population of the PRC after that community's return to the "motherland."

This book represents a valuable addition to contemporary research on the overseas Chinese, Chinese migration, Cold War international relations, and Sino-Indonesian relations. I do have a few critical comments. For readers who do not have strong background in migration studies and the history of Chinese overseas communities, it would be valuable if the author would frame the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in larger context of modern Chinese migration. I am fully aware that Zhou's book is a historically oriented case study with no general comparative goals and does not aim at generalizations; however, it would be very useful if the reader could see what crucial similarities and dissimilarities there were between the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (and the PRC's relations to them) and ethnic Chinese elsewhere. Even without attempting to generalize from the Indonesian case, it seems to me that it is important to know at least briefly to what extent the situation of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and the PRC's attitude towards them were typical of a number of similar cases.¹⁹ Thus, this book is nicely supplemented by general accounts of the history of modern Chinese migration, such as the recent volume by Steven B. Miles volume on "Chinese diasporas" since the sixteenth century.²⁰ Further, it is a pity that the book did not include more information about the PRC's cultural diplomacy towards the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (as it does, for instance, on pages 86-87, which discuss the impact of Communist movies and journals on the ethnic Chinese imagination of the mainland). That issue is one of the most interesting aspects of PRC-overseas Chinese relations. On the other hand, I very much appreciated the book's treatment of the Indonesian government's monitoring of the cultural sphere of the ethnic Chinese (99-103). Finally, even though the book touches upon the important role of returned overseas Chinese in the economic reforms of the Reform era led by later "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping in the book's conclusion, because of the limited time frame of the book, we do not learn more about this process of high significance. An expansion of the concluding chapter to elaborate on this issue would have been welcome.

Overall Taomo Zhou has provided us with a valuable and exciting piece of research that shows the new directions that research about Cold War history, Chinese politics, and migration can take.

¹⁹ In my previous research I analyzed the significant decrease of the PRC support to communist forces around Southeast Asia in the post-Mao era. Many members of these insurgencies were ethnic Chinese and we can see from Taomo Zhou's book that this pragmatic and cautious policy was partially implemented already during the Mao era, at least until 1965–1966. Stanislav Myšička, "Chinese Support for Communist Insurgencies in Southeast Asia during the Cold War," *International Journal of China Studies* 6:3 (2015): 203–230. See also Jian Chen, *China and the Cold War after Mao*, in M. Leffler and O.A. Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 181–200.

²⁰ Steven B. Miles, *Chinese Diasporas. A Social History of Global Migration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020).

REVIEW BY BRADLEY SIMPSON, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

I first traveled to Indonesia in July 1998, shortly after the mass demonstrations which ousted then President Suharto and inaugurated Indonesia's transition to democracy after 32 years of authoritarian rule. Many neighborhoods in Jakarta still displayed the charred, blackened ruins of buildings burned in anti-Chinese riots stoked by the Army and intelligence forces in which nearly 1,000 people were killed and hundreds of ethnic Chinese women were sexually assaulted. The May 1998 riots, ostensibly sparked by rampant price increases resulting from the Asian financial crisis, grew out of decades of violence and discrimination directed at Indonesia's immigrant Chinese and ethnic Chinese community. In particular, as Taomo Zhou suggests in *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, they recalled the 1965-1966 mass murders and anti-Chinese violence following the September 30th Movement and counter-coup which brought Suharto to power, and which Suharto and the Indonesian Army blamed in part on China's support for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Much of the existing scholarly literature on Chinese-Indonesian relations focuses on bilateral diplomacy during the Sukarno and Suharto era, social histories of local ethnic Chinese business communities and leaders, and the 1965-1966 mass killings, rarely integrating different methodological approaches and scales of analysis, much less Indonesian and Chinese language sources.²¹ Broad histories of Chinese migration, likewise, often neglect local perspectives.²² Diplomatic approaches routinely fail to illuminate the lives of ordinary Chinese and Indonesians buffeted by Cold War conflict.²³ By integrating diplomatic, social, and migration histories of Chinese-Indonesians, Zhou provides the most comprehensive and engaging scholarly account of Chinese-Indonesian relations in decades. She argues that competition between the Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist parties deeply shaped the social and political lives of *Peranakan* (Indonesian-born) and *Totok* (immigrant) Chinese-Indonesians from the 1940s through the 1960s, as well as Jakarta's views of them, which in turn shaped Chinese-Indonesian relations more broadly. Even during the early 1960s, when Sukarno embraced Beijing as a diplomatic ally, "governmental relations inevitably intersected with communal politics and ethnic tensions" (4).

Chinese began migrating in large numbers to Indonesia in the late nineteenth century, and, as nationalist movements proliferated in China, began to develop a "growing sense of national solidarity" expressed through political and business associations and Chinese language newspapers. Dutch colonial officials extended a variety of tax and economic privileges to ethnic Chinese, whom they treated as foreign nationals rather than colonial subjects (22). As the Indonesian revolution unfolded after 1945, many Chinese-Indonesians faced violence and persecution by *pribumi* Indonesians who viewed them as part of a privileged economic class and "part of the colonial legacy that needed to be dismantled during the revolution" (21-22). Already, however, the Chinese revolution was shaping Indonesian domestic politics. The Dutch-allied Chinese Nationalist Government "was unsympathetic toward Indonesia's anticolonial struggle" and sought to maintain jurisdiction and control over local Chinese immigrants, encouraging the formation of armed self-defense groups, deepening the distrust of Indonesian Republican forces, and complicating efforts to incorporate Chinese-Indonesians as citizens of an independent Indonesia (33). The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, encouraged left wing students, civic organizations, and writers such as Ba Ren (who was himself an undercover Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agent) to "devote themselves, politically and economically, to Indonesia's struggle for self-determination" (36). Zhou beautifully evokes Ba Ren's poetic

²¹ Hong Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011); for the latter, see Leo Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesian, the Chinese Minority, and China* (Singapore: Heinmann, 1992); Peck Yang Twang, *The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 1940-1950* (Kuala Lumpur: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: The Mechanics of Mass Murder* (London: Routledge, 2018), Ch. 7.

²² Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland Modern China in the Age of Global Migration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Steven B. Miles, *Chinese Diasporas: A Social History of Global Migration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

²³ On the broader role of China in shaping regional politics see Ang Cheng Guan, *Southeast Asia's Cold War: An Interpretive History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

and literary efforts to convince Chinese-Indonesians to reject their ethnic and class privilege and enlist their support for the Revolution (38-49) until his arrest and expulsion by Dutch officials in 1947. He later returned as the PRC's first Ambassador to Indonesia.

Chinese Communist and Nationalist forces continued to vie for influence in Indonesia after 1949. As the PRC sought to establish stable diplomatic relations with an Indonesian government that was still deeply suspicious of its intentions, Republic of China officials in Taipei "forged alliances with ... Indonesian right-wing forces through the personal networks of remaining Chinese Nationalist loyalists" (53). By 1955, Zhou observes, Sukarno began to see Beijing as a possible anticolonial ally, and signed a dual-nationality treaty giving Chinese-Indonesians a choice between becoming full Indonesian citizens and remaining foreign nationals. Taiwanese officials condemned the treaty as a trojan horse for Communist subversion in Indonesia, continued to seek common cause with anti-Communist Indonesian officials and organizations such as the Masyumi, and backed the secessionist Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion from 1957-1959.

The diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei, Zhou demonstrates, deeply conditioned relations among local Chinese-Indonesian communities, and "shaped the Indonesian government's view of the ethnic Chinese as disloyal and destabilizing" (96). Government mistrust prompted heightened surveillance of Chinese schools, media, and civic organizations and deepening suspicions among *pribumi* Indonesians, who began to view the actions of all ethnic Chinese as a function of relations with Beijing and their brethren as undifferentiated agents of Communist influence (112-114). Growing *pribumi* hostility towards rural Chinese merchants, resentment of Taipei's support for the PRRI rebellion, and anti-Communist opposition to perceived links between the PKI and Beijing placed enormous pressure on Sukarno, who responded by issuing a series of decrees that "required the suspension of all Chinese retailers' business activities in rural areas ... and legitimized the takeover of foreign enterprises by indigenous merchants" (114).

The 1959-1960 anti-Chinese campaign prompted more than 100,000 ethnic Chinese to leave the country for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's response, however, was strangely muted, a function of its growing appreciation of Indonesia's strategic importance and Sukarno's gradual shift towards China in the Sino-Soviet split. As a result, PRC Chairman Mao Zedong backed Indonesia's campaign of *Konfrontasi* towards Malaysia, offered significant economic and later military assistance to Jakarta, and developed close ties to the PKI. But he doubted Sukarno's revolutionary commitment, and Chinese officials privately viewed the Indonesian President as erratic and unreliable.

The Chinese response to the September 30th Movement highlighted Beijing's ambivalence towards its de facto alliance with Jakarta. Though Beijing and Jakarta exchanged a steady stream of visitors in 1964-1965 and Mao endorsed PKI calls for the formation of an armed "fifth force" of militant peasants, Zhou persuasively demonstrates that Beijing was only vaguely aware of PKI Chairman Aidit's plans (160-165) and played no direct role in the Movement itself. Chinese officials naively thought that the Movement might produce a more progressive Indonesian government. They also gravely underestimated the determination of the Indonesian Army and its anti-Communist allies to annihilate the PKI and affiliated mass organizations, and were outraged by the campaign of anti-Chinese violence that accompanied the Army's campaign of mass murder.

The Cultural Revolution in China began just as the Indonesian Army was winding down the mass killings and forcing Sukarno to hand over power to General Suharto. Ironically, Zhou argues, Beijing's violent denunciation of the mass killings in Indonesia and the Army's ousting of Sukarno helped to legitimize the Army's re-fashioning of the September 30th Movement as a Chinese-led coup attempt and Jakarta's decision in October 1967 to suspend diplomatic relations with the PRC (166-168). Taiwanese officials endorsed the Suharto regime's version of events and attempted with modest success to fill the political void and establish closer economic ties with Jakarta, but they could not fully displace Chinese power in the region, especially as the Cultural Revolution began to wind down and Chinese diplomats re-engaged with regional diplomacy.

The September 30th Movement and the campaign of anti-Chinese violence that followed sparked another wave of ethnic-Chinese migration to Western nations, Taiwan, and to China itself. Zhou ends the book by exploring the experiences of some of the thousands of “returned overseas Chinese” resettled in Fujian and Guangdong province, utilizing provincial Chinese archives and an extraordinary set of oral histories (for an example see pp.187-191). Many returnees, she shows, struggled to adjust to the radically different political, economic, and environmental conditions they faced. Though Beijing celebrated the returnees as devotees of Mao and symbols of resistance to the Suharto regime, local authorities also struggled to regulate the behavior of former Chinese merchants, farmers, and businessmen who “carried with them the daily practices of capitalism and connections to the circulation of capital in the wider world” (210).

Zhou drew on a wide range of sources to reconstruct the transnational lives of Chinese-Indonesians, including Chinese and Indonesian language newspapers, and material from the Indonesian National Archives, Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, Chinese provincial archives, archival collections in Taipei, and oral histories. It is hard to ask for more from such a wide-ranging and well-written history, which operates at multiple scales of analysis, moves across a vast geographic area, yet provides deep and intimate biographical and local portraits of Chinese-Indonesians. Yet Zhou’s account raises a few questions she might have explored in more depth. First, how did the PKI understand and relate to the anti-Chinese campaign of 1959-1960 and communal tensions within the *Peranakan* and *Totok* communities more generally, especially as the party began to align itself more openly with Beijing in the Sino-Soviet split? While PKI leaders understood the anti-Chinese campaign as in part an attempt to undermine relations with Beijing, the Party also sought to bolster its nationalist credentials and recognized the broad support for expropriating rural Chinese-Indonesian businesses. Second, how did the ‘red-blue’ tensions she describes shape the careers of the generation of Chinese-Indonesian businessmen such as Liem Sioe Liong, who later became such important political and economic backers of the Suharto regime?

These questions aside, *Migration in a Time of Revolution* succeeds magnificently on its own terms. Zhou has not only provided us with a model of transnational scholarship that reshapes our understanding of modern Indonesia, but offers a methodological roadmap for historians elsewhere who are seeking to integrate diplomatic, social, and migration histories.

 RESPONSE BY TAOMO ZHOU, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE

I would like to thank H-Diplo's Diane Labrosse and Masami Kimura for organizing this roundtable on *Migration in the Time of Revolution*. It is their efforts to put together a panel of outstanding scholars whose work I greatly admire. It is a great privilege for *Migration in the Time of Revolution* to have been read and discussed by experts from across different disciplines and fields including history, anthropology, and political science and Chinese foreign relations, Chinese diaspora studies, modern Indonesia and the Cold War. I am also grateful to Lorenz Lüthi for bringing these different perspectives together in his introduction.

I am immensely grateful to the reviewers for their generous reading of the book and their thoughtful engagements with it. Based on her in-depth knowledge of the field of Chinese Indonesian studies, Wu-Ling Chong succinctly summarizes the new findings of *Migration in the Time of Revolution* into five points. The word "migration" in the title of the book is a contested one. As Sai Siew Min wrote in her review of the book in the *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, I could have better theorized the entanglement between the movement of Chinese diaspora and the border-making and state-formation processes in Southeast Asia "during a postcolonial moment."²⁴ Vanessa Hearman unpacks the concept of migration better than I did, as she identifies the broad theme of the book as "mobility in the twentieth century," including voluntary migration for educational purposes, exiles due to political reasons and displacement due to discriminatory economic policies. I am touched by Hearman's evaluation of the book as "deeply humanistic" and her personal account about "a letter with spidery handwriting bearing a Hong Kong postmark" from a great aunt who "returned" to Chairman Mao Zedong's China. Hearman's own rigorous work in capturing human experiences and emotions through mass violence, regime change, and political suppression has been an important source of inspiration for this book.²⁵

If I had a chance to revise the book, I'd take up Stanislav Myšička's suggestion to "frame the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the larger context of modern Chinese migration." Here, Chong's quote of Wang Gungwu's essay "Are Indonesian Chinese Unique?" at the beginning of her review answers Myšička's question regarding the "crucial similarities and dissimilarities there were between the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and ethnic Chinese elsewhere." Wang Gungwu notes that, compared with Chinese minorities in other countries, "nowhere have more Overseas Chinese been killed or wounded, run away or been chased away, and been so insecure during the past twenty years [1950s-1970s] than in Indonesia."²⁶ As Chong points out, the frequency and severity of racialized violence in the past and the entrenched prejudice and hostility until the present distinguish Chinese Indonesians from other Chinese diasporic groups. Beyond the field of Chinese diaspora studies, *Migration in the Time of Revolution* speaks to the mid-twentieth century phenomenon in of diasporic groups being compelled to abandon their transnational networks and multiple belongings and to make exclusive nationality choices. Since the publication of the book, I have been working with my colleagues Chien Wen Kung and Sayaka Chatani in juxtaposing three Asian diasporic communities: the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippine Chinese and Koreans in Japan (*zainichi*).²⁷ These three groups, which have rarely been studied together, were all rendered "orphans of empire" by the

²⁴ Sai Siew Min, Review of *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 15 (2020), 141-144.

²⁵ Vanessa Hearman, *Unmarked Graves: Death and Survival in the Anti- Communist Violence in East Java, Indonesia* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2018).

²⁶ Wang Gungwu, "Are Indonesian Chinese Unique?: Some Observations," in J. A. C. Mackie, ed., *The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays* (West Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1976), 204.

²⁷ Sayaka Chatani, "Revisiting Korean Slums in Postwar Japan: Tongne and Hakkyo in the Zainichi Memoryspace," *Journal of Asian Studies* 80:3: 587-610; Chien Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022).

emergence of new nation-states in the region after 1945 and the subsequent suspension of free intra-Asian circular migrations.²⁸

Both Bradley Simpson and Myšička raise important questions regarding Indonesia's position in the Sino-Soviet split and Beijing's cultural diplomacy towards the diaspora. Into the 1960s, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the largest non-ruling Communist party in the world at the time, sided with Beijing against Moscow in the escalating "shadow cold war" between the two communist giants.²⁹ Unlike Chinese-majority Southeast Asian Communist parties such as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the PKI's core leadership consisted mostly of *pribumi* Indonesians. The supposedly 'alien' origin of the Chinese Indonesians undermined the PKI's efforts to project itself as a patriotic political force rather than a puppet of a foreign Communist sponsor. Thus, the PKI eschewed openly criticizing the Indonesian government's discriminative legislations against the ethnic Chinese. I appreciate Myšička's close attention to China's propaganda that targeted the diaspora and the Indonesia's government's surveillance of the Chinese cultural sphere as portrayed in my book. There have been some exciting developments in the research on this subject in the past three years. Josh Stenberg's *Minority Stages*, Beiyu Zhang's *Chinese Theatre Troupes in Southeast Asia* and Jeremy Taylor and Lanjun Xu's edited volume, *Chineseness and the Cold War*, reveal the complexity and diversity of the Beijing's diaspora-oriented propaganda via mediums including literature, cinema, dance, and theatre.³⁰

Chong, Simpson and Myšička all enquire about how the co-evolution of diasporic politics and revolutionary diplomacy in 1945-1965 influenced the dynamics between China and Indonesia in the ensuing decades. Their questions have inspired me to write a sequel to the current book, tentatively entitled "Deterritorialized Diplomacy: China, Taiwan, and Indonesia beyond the Cold War." Building on Simpson's earlier work, this book will examine the emergence and convergence of state-directed economic development models across Asia in the global 1970s, when the international political economy experienced structural changes after the Ronald Reagan-Margaret Thatcher Revolution.³¹ I hope to look at how China and Indonesia continued to interact despite the fact that formal governmental ties were "frozen" in 1967; how Taiwan, with uncertain nation-state status, forged ties with Southeast Asia's most populous nation; and how non-state actors—merchants, students, and "unofficial ambassadors"—helped shape international relations.³² The last group included Chinese Indonesian business tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, who had been 'apolitical' in the 1950s and early 1960s but rose to prominence after Suharto consolidated his power. Although culturally a *totok*, Liem's loyalty was not oriented towards the nation-states

²⁸ Sunil Amrith, *Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 117-120; Robert Cribb and Li Narango, "Orphans of Empire: Divided Peoples, Dilemmas of Identity, and Old Imperial Borders in East and Southeast Asia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46:1 (2004): 164-187.

²⁹ Lorenz Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2015).

³⁰ Josh Stenberg, *Minority Stages: Sino-Indonesian Performance and Public Display* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019); Beiyu Zhang, *Chinese Theatre Troupes in Southeast Asia: Touring Diaspora, 1900s-1970s* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021); Jeremy E. Taylor and Lanjun Xu, eds., *Chinese and the Cold War: Contested Cultures and Diaspora in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021).

³¹ Brad Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Simpson, "Indonesian Transmigration and the Crisis of Development, 1968-1985," *Diplomatic History* 45:2: 268-284.

³² On Taiwan's relations with Indonesia, see Hsiao-ting Lin, *Jiang Jingguo de Taiwan shidai: Zhonghua minguo yu lengzhan xia de Taiwan* [Chiang Ching-kuo's Taiwan era: The Republic of China and Taiwan during the Cold War] (Taipei: yuanzu wenhua, 2021); Lin Ping and Lin Dongyu, "Dakai heihezi: lengzhan shiqi de Taiwan yu Yinni guanxi fazhan (1949-1971)" [Opening the black box: a study of Taiwan-Indonesia relations during the Cold War, 1949-1971], *Asia-Pacific Research Forum* 68: 87-116.

claimed by either Beijing or Taipei, but his hometown of Fuqing. The localist Chinese identity allowed Liem a great degree of flexibility, as he sought collaborations with business partners in Taiwan when the island enjoyed its fame as one of the ‘Asian Tigers’ while deftly expanding business operations in the mainland after the Asian Financial Crisis. The Fuqing identity also brought Liem the political capital to associate himself with Xi Jinping, the current President of China who served in the early 2000s as the governor of Fujian Province.³³ Governments also took advantage of diasporic business tycoons’ transnational networks. Interestingly, as Liu Hong’s research shows, the normalization of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations was negotiated through Tong Djoe, a Medan-born, Fujianese entrepreneur listed as one of the most influential Chinese economic elites in Indonesia together with Liem.³⁴

³³ Richard Borsuk and Nancy Chng, *Liem Sioe Liong’s Salim Group: The Business Pillar of Suharto’s Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2014).

³⁴ Hong Liu, “Social Capital and Business Networking: A Case Study of Modern Chinese Transnationalism,” *Southeast Asian Studies* 39:3: 358-383.