

The China Quarterly

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY>

Additional services for *The China Quarterly*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)



Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965

Taomo Zhou

The China Quarterly / Volume 221 / March 2015, pp 208 - 228

DOI: 10.1017/S0305741014001544, Published online: 11 February 2015

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741014001544

How to cite this article:

Taomo Zhou (2015). Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965. *The China Quarterly*, 221, pp 208–228 doi:10.1017/S0305741014001544

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965*

Taomo Zhou[†]

Abstract

From 1960 until 1965, the People's Republic of China (PRC) built a remarkably cordial quasi alliance with the Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, however, the years between 1960 and 1965 were marked by two large waves of anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia. Although more than half a century has passed since these events, our understanding of Chinese foreign policy towards Indonesia during these turbulent years remains incomplete. In 2008, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives declassified for the first time documents produced during the years between 1961 and 1965. However, very recently in summer 2013, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives re-classified the main body of its collection. Through examining this body of fresh but currently inaccessible official records, this article aims to bridge the gap between scholarly works on the PRC's diplomatic history and overseas Chinese history. By tracing the processes by which Chinese diplomats dealt with Sukarno, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, or the PKI), this article argues that the ambivalent Chinese alliance with Indonesia was shaped by three disparate pressures which interacted and competed with one another: the strategic need to befriend Third World countries, ethnic ties to the Chinese in Indonesia and ideological commitment to the international communist movement.

Keywords: Sino-Indonesian relations; Cold War diplomacy; Third World; overseas Chinese; international communist movement

From 1960 until 1965, the People's Republic of China (PRC) built a remarkably cordial quasi alliance with the Republic of Indonesia.¹ Beijing regarded Jakarta as an important partner in the formerly colonized world, who shared its

* The author would like to thank Chen Jian, Jack Meng-tat Chia, Sherman Cochran, Charles Kraus, Hong Liu, Hajimu Masuda, Andrew Mertha, Glen Peterson, Eric Tagliacozzo and Arne Westad for their comments on earlier drafts of this article; Jeffery Petersen and Liren Zheng for their help with materials; and the Cornell East Asia Program for financial support.

[†] Cornell University. Email: tz84@cornell.edu.

1 In the context of Beijing–Jakarta relations in the early 1960s, “alliance” and “ally” are used as broadly defined terms, referring to alignment or strategic cooperation rather than having the usual connotation of treaty-bound security commitments. As discussed in detail in the later part of this article, Indonesia was an important ally in this sense in Beijing's anti-imperialist intermediate zone.

aspiration to replace the bipolar world structure dominated by Moscow and Washington with a more equitable international order. To alleviate the isolation it suffered after the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) offered an enthusiastic endorsement of the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, or the PKI).² High-level visits and cultural, educational and economic exchanges between the two nations reached a climax between 1964 and 1965.

At the same time, the years between 1960 and 1965 witnessed two waves of anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia. There were approximately two million Chinese resident in Indonesia in the mid-20th century. From 1959 to 1960, a major crisis arose when Indonesian governmental decrees revoked the licences of non-citizen Chinese to operate retail businesses in the countryside.³ Five years later, another crisis occurred in the aftermath of the 30 September Movement. In the early morning of 1 October 1965, Indonesian army units from the presidential palace guard abducted and later killed six senior anti-communist generals. Major General Suharto launched an effective counterattack the next day.⁴ Recent research indicates that a clandestine group within the PKI plotted the coup. This group included the PKI chairman, D.N. Aidit, but excluded other members of the politburo as well as the rank and file of the party. The coup aimed to remove senior anti-communist generals, thereby paving the way for a communist hegemony in Indonesian politics.⁵ During the nationwide anti-communist campaign launched by Suharto after the coup, the Indonesian army put direct pressure on the Chinese population to leave the archipelago.⁶ Beijing sent out ships to bring ethnic Chinese back to China during both waves of the anti-Chinese campaigns. In total, an estimated 200,000 Chinese responded to the campaigns by leaving Indonesia and returning to China. In 1967, Beijing suspended diplomatic relations with Jakarta.

How could Beijing have remarkably cordial relations with Jakarta during a period that was marked by major anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia? And why did this honeymoon period in Sino-Indonesian relations end so abruptly? This article aims to answer these two questions by examining the dynamics of Chinese policy towards Indonesia from 1960 to 1965.

2 The PKI was the third largest communist party in the world after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP.

3 See Coppel 1983, 37–38.

4 For an overview of the coup and the massacres that followed, see Cribb 2004. For different interpretations on the coup in English language literature, see Brackman 1969; Anderson and McVey 1971; Crouch 1978; Fic 2004; Roosa 2006.

5 Roosa 2006.

6 Against the perception that the Chinese Indonesians were particularly targeted for violence, Robert Cribb and Charles A. Coppel argue that the Chinese were not killed on the same scale as the indigenous population during 1965–1966. See Cribb and Coppel 2009. Cribb and Coppel's argument is confirmed by more recent research by Yen-ling Tsai and Douglas Kammen on the Chinese in Medan. See Tsai and Kammen 2012.

Literature Review and Methodology

Although more than half a century has passed since these events, our understanding of Chinese foreign policy towards Indonesia between 1960 and 1965 remains incomplete. From the late 1960s to the late 1990s, the lack of sources meant that research on this topic was limited to the analysis of news releases.⁷ In the past decade, although the opening of Chinese archives has made it possible for historians to gain a better understanding of the formation of Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War, Chinese policy towards Indonesia has fallen by the wayside.⁸ Hong Liu's recently published *China and the Shaping of Indonesia* is the only piece of scholarship that has made use of the newly available Chinese sources.⁹ The book offers an inspiring account of Indonesian intellectual history as well as a detailed examination of cultural diplomacy between China and Indonesia during the years between 1949 and 1965. However, because Liu relies heavily on sources from the early to mid-1950s, his work ignores the eventful and important years from 1960 to 1965.

This article aims to fill the gap in the existing scholarship through a critical reading of documents recently declassified by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing. In November 2008, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives declassified for the first time Chinese diplomatic documents produced during the years between 1961 and 1965.¹⁰ The collection comprises documents generated by different levels of government, ranging from minutes of meetings between top-level Chinese leaders and foreign visitors, to lower-level communications between Chinese embassies and consulates abroad and in Beijing. This immense body of fresh historical material is complemented by other Chinese language documents available on the topic, including memoirs, newspapers and periodicals. In addition to these textual sources, I have also conducted interviews with retired Chinese diplomats who were eyewitnesses to these five turbulent years in Sino-Indonesian relations. Unfortunately, owing to the scarcity of materials from the Indonesian side, I am limited to Chinese-language sources in this article.¹¹

7 See Williams 1962; Howie 1968; Simon 1969; Dake 1973; Mozingo 1976; Sukma 1999.

8 For representative works on China's experience during the Cold War, see Chen 2001; Niu 2005; Luthi 2008; Shen and Li 2011.

9 Liu 2011.

10 This is the second batch of declassified materials from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives. The first batch of declassified materials includes documents produced between 1956 and 1960, which were made available to the general public in June 2006. However, very recently in summer 2013, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives re-classified the main body of its collection, a decision which means that almost all of the documents used in this paper are no longer available.

11 Unlike its Chinese counterpart, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have its own archives. Almost all of its historical documents are kept at the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia*, or ANRI). When I visited ANRI in February 2013, I was informed that there was quite a number of foreign relations-related documents during the period under study at ANRI's deposit, but that these documents remained disorganized and would not be ready to be released to the public in the near future. Moreover, many documents produced during the 1950s and 1960s were destroyed or lost during the mass violence in 1965–1966. There are, however, occasionally publications of first person accounts on the subject. See, e.g., Harsono 1977.

In addition to introducing new sources, this article aims to engage with the burgeoning field of Cold War international history.¹² The international approach to the Cold War emphasizes not only great power politics but also the internal dynamics within the Third World – the “the former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination.”¹³ The PRC’s policy towards Third World countries during the Cold War is an important but generally understudied area in both history and political science. By looking at Beijing’s policy towards Indonesia, I will explore a major relationship in the developing world during the Cold War.

Last but not least, this article aims to bridge the gap between scholarly works on the PRC’s diplomatic history and overseas Chinese history. Although the scholarship on Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War has undergone major developments, the core endeavour of the existing body of literature remains the study of the highly centralized state under Mao Zedong. Meanwhile, the study of the Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia has been a long-established field and, in recent years, a new trend towards transnational studies has begun to show the importance of transnational networks in Chinese communities in South-East Asia and beyond.¹⁴ This new approach calls for students of “transnational China” to step out of the analytical frameworks that are centred on nation states or some other territorially based social, political, economic or cultural grouping.¹⁵ By highlighting how the flow of Chinese migrants overlapped with the PRC’s state-to-state relations, I seek to bring the studies of international politics and transnational movements together.¹⁶

Background: The PRC’s Domestic Politics and International Strategy

The period from the early to mid-1960s was a time of domestic tumult and international challenges for the PRC. In the spring of 1957, Mao, who was convinced that the CCP cadres had grown attached to their privileges, launched the “democratic consolidation of spirits” (*minzhu zhengfeng* 民主整风) campaign. This campaign against bureaucratism, subjectivism and factionalism was soon followed by the Anti-Rightist Movement (*fan youpai yundong* 反右派运动), resulting in a tense domestic political atmosphere. Subsequently, the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), the original aim of which was to accelerate the pace of the modernization of China’s economy, resulted in three years of catastrophic economic recession. These domestic political movements had a profound

12 For the methodology and state of the field of Cold War international history, see Westad 2000.

13 Westad 2005, 3.

14 See, e.g., Pan 1990; Wang 1991; Tan 2004; Suryadinata 2007; Kuhn 2008.

15 See, e.g., Ong 1999; McKeown 2001, 2008.

16 A fine example of scholarship that brings the Chinese diaspora into diplomatic history is Meredith Oyen’s (2010) study on the propaganda war between the PRC and the United States which targeted the Chinese minority in South-East Asia.

impact on China's foreign relations. The pragmatic and moderate policy line defined by the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence (*heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze* 和平共处五项原则) in 1954 was interrupted. In the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, as part of a critical reflection on domestic and international policies, the Chinese leadership established the principle of "actively opening up a new horizon in foreign relations" (*nuli zhudong de zaiwai-jiaoshang kaichuang xin de jumian* 努力主动地在外交上开创新的局面) in January 1961.¹⁷ However, this policy adjustment was short lived. In 1962, Wang Jiaxiang 王稼祥, the CCP International Bureau chief who proposed that Beijing should endeavour to search for stability with major power players, was fiercely attacked by Mao.¹⁸ With Mao denouncing any attempt to ease international tensions as "rightist," an international outlook that denied any possibility for détente or long-term peace emerged as the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.

The PRC's policy towards Indonesia between 1960 and 1965 was a reflection of the general radicalization of its domestic and foreign policies. As the Sino-Soviet alliance was coming to an end, Beijing began to shift its attention to the post-colonial nation states that could be potential new partners in an international front against both superpowers. China's perception of former colonial countries, such as Indonesia under President Sukarno's rule, had its origins in Mao's conceptualization of the "intermediate zone" (*zhongjian didai* 中间地带), a perceived buffer between the two superpowers, which included many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa.¹⁹ In the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of the "intermediate zone" gradually evolved into a line of strategic thinking that aimed to contest the Cold War bipolar international structure and to reorganize the existing pattern of alignments. In 1964, Mao began to believe that a global war was imminent and a Third World alignment would bring about a decisive shift in world politics. He told a group of Indonesian visitors that "the Soviet Union emerged from the First World War; China and many other socialist countries came out of the Second World War; and imperialism will perish in a Third World War."²⁰

Beijing's honeymoon with Jakarta also coincided with increasing US involvement in South-East Asia. The PRC's expansion of its influence in Indonesia was partly intended to counterbalance the American military presence across China's southern border in Vietnam and Laos. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, the anti-imperialist movements in South-East Asia were closely connected. In September 1963, at a four-party conference of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Indonesian communist leaders, Zhou Enlai 周恩来 proclaimed that South-East Asia had become the key arena for international anti-imperialist

17 Wu 1999, 234.

18 Niu 2005, 29–36.

19 Mao 1971[1946], 348.

20 "Conversation between Chairman Mao and head of Indonesian Congress," 9 June 1964, Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter "CFMA"), 105-01336-02.

struggle. “As the reliable home front of South-East Asian revolutions,” Zhou said, “China had the responsibility to fully support anti-imperialist struggles in the region.”²¹ During 1963 and 1964, Jakarta was engaged in an undeclared insurgent war with Malaysia (known as the *Konfrontasi*) aimed at blocking British plans to merge the remains of its former South-East Asian colonies into the Federation of Malaysia. From Beijing’s perspective, with Indonesia opposing Malaysia, North Vietnam struggling to overthrow the Diem regime in the South, and Thailand and the Philippines fighting to break away from imperialist control, the United States would soon be expelled from the region by “a magnificent wave of anti-imperialist struggles.”²²

Indonesia was categorized as a “bourgeois nationalist” country in the standard Marxist analytical lenses commonly adopted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Yet, during the early 1960s, the archipelago was increasingly recognized by the top leaders in Beijing as a crucial ally in the intermediate zone. There was a greater convergence of interests and objectives between the two countries, with Indonesia also starting to pursue an actively anti-imperialist foreign policy in the early 1960s. The Chinese leadership was particularly attracted by President Sukarno’s formulation that the world struggle was between the “old dying forces” (capitalism and imperialism) and the “new emerging forces” (nationalism and communism), a slogan that echoed Beijing’s strategic thinking. Whether a regime was prepared to challenge the existing international order vigorously had become the most important criteria for China to judge whether a state was “socialist” or not. This underlying logic was reflected in the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi’s 陈毅 conversation with his Indonesian counterpart, Subandrio:

Ask the Soviets: What is socialism? Should it be the British Labour Party’s socialism? Or the Vatican’s socialism? Or Khrushchev’s socialism? Or Lenin and Stalin’s socialism? Or Mao Zedong’s socialism? Which is it? President Sukarno firmly opposes imperialism and colonialism. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism will become socialism in the future! If one wants to build socialism, learn from Sukarno’s socialism.²³

An Uncertain Partnership: The PRC and Sukarno

On the macro level, Indonesia played an important role in the PRC’s strategy in the Third World. Beijing had invested greatly in cultivating its relationship with President Sukarno, most prominently exemplified by, as shown in the paragraphs below, its support for his West Irian campaign in 1961 and *Konfrontasi* in 1963.²⁴ However, on the micro level, even during the years when bilateral relations were

21 Tong 1996, 219.

22 “Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and the military advisor of the Indonesian president,” 2 October 1964, CFMA, 105-01240-03.

23 “Conversation between Vice-Premier Chen Yi and Subandrio,” 24 January 1965, CFMA, 105-01910-05.

24 West Irian is the western half of the island of New Guinea, which used to be under the colonial control of the Netherlands. Dutch and Indonesian leaders failed to reach an agreement on the sovereignty of West Irian at the Roundtable Conference in 1949. During the 1950s, the Dutch efforts to prepare West Irian for full independence were deemed as a blatant assault on their sovereignty by Indonesian leaders.

most cordial, Sukarno remained an uncertain partner in the eyes of the Chinese diplomats on the ground. He had been savvy, or even manipulative, in his dealings with the Americans, the Soviets and the Chinese. The “dark side and the double-dealings of the bourgeois nationalists”²⁵ were frequently exposed and Chinese foreign policy practitioners and decision makers regarded Sukarno with suspicion.

In the summer of 1960, Sukarno’s campaign to reclaim West Irian as Indonesian territory reached a climax and received staunch encouragement from Beijing. By portraying Sukarno as a nationalist hero who safeguarded Indonesia’s territorial integrity in its propaganda, the PRC was attempting to rally support from Afro-Asian countries in order to offset the increasing animosity between China and India. China’s relations with this important neighbour and former crucial ally in Asia deteriorated sharply after the Tibetan uprising in 1959, the exile of the 14th Dalai Lama to India, and the subsequent serious border conflicts.²⁶ When Mao met Sukarno in June 1961, the chairman even tried to provoke antagonism between Indonesia and India by insinuating that the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, wanted to snatch the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement from Sukarno.²⁷ During a meeting with Subandrio in 1963, Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 openly dismissed India as a “chauvinist country” and Nehru as “no longer representative of Afro-Asian countries.” Liu suggested that Sukarno should assume the leading role in Afro-Asian unity instead.²⁸

While the top leaders in Beijing were singing Sukarno’s praises as the pioneer of the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle, the Chinese diplomats in Indonesia depicted Sukarno as a shrewd politician who pitted the great powers against each other in their reports to Beijing. The Chinese diplomatic mission’s first major disappointment with Sukarno occurred when Moscow began to bid for influence in Indonesia. In February 1960, the Soviet Union strengthened its ties with Indonesia through Khrushchev’s visit to the country and the offer of a US\$250 million concessionary loan. Against the background of the widening rift between Beijing and Moscow, the Chinese embassy in Jakarta downplayed the actual impact of Khrushchev’s visit. It reported back to Beijing that “the flamboyant welcoming ceremonies were superficial,” and that “Sukarno accompanied Khrushchev only to raise his own political status in international affairs.”²⁹ Another memo concluded that Jakarta did not sincerely aspire to a genuine friendship with Moscow as “the ruling class in Indonesia wanted Khrushchev’s money but not his influence.”³⁰

25 “British relations with India and Malaysia,” 31 January 1964, CFMA, 110-01696-03.

26 See Niu 2005.

27 “Conversation between Chairman Mao and Indonesian President Sukarno,” 13 June 1961, CFMA, 204-01469-02.

28 “Briefings on Subandrio’s visit to China,” 13 January 1963, CFMA, 204-01504-01.

29 “Briefings on Khrushchev’s visit to Indonesia,” 29 February 1960, CFMA, 105-00713-01.

30 *Ibid.*

Eventually, Sukarno won the West Irian campaign as the United States exerted diplomatic pressure on the Netherlands to transfer the sovereignty of the region to Indonesia. However, Sukarno soon redirected the nation's political interests to another crisis – the confrontation with Malaysia. Beijing strongly endorsed Sukarno by condemning Malaysia as a “neocolonialist scheme ... produced by Britain, and masterminded by the US.”³¹ The Chinese diplomatic mission in Indonesia observed how Sukarno vacillated between escalation and de-escalation in the *Konfrontasi* and how he based his policy choices upon opportunistic calculations. For example, in early 1964, Sukarno declared a ceasefire and resumed tripartite talks between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In an intelligence briefing sent back to Beijing, the Chinese embassy in Indonesia suggested that Sukarno would “seek for common interests with the reactionaries in Malaysia and the Philippines.”³²

The convoluted negotiation process between China and Indonesia over the Second Afro-Asian Conference (or the Second Bandung Conference) increased the Chinese embassy's ambivalence towards Sukarno. The Second Bandung Conference was part of Beijing's effort to compete with the perceived imperialists and revisionists for influence in formal colonial countries.³³ However, despite the persistent urging from Beijing, Sukarno seemed less enthusiastic about the Second Bandung Conference than about the conference of non-aligned countries, which Beijing regarded as its major rival. Sukarno co-founded the conference of non-aligned countries with the PRC's three major nemeses in the Third World: Nehru of India, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Until 1964, Sukarno preferred to join India and Egypt in manoeuvring between the two camps rather than to ally with China in confronting both superpowers. To China's relief, Sukarno was rejected at the conference of non-aligned countries in October 1964 owing to his policy of confrontation with Malaysia. In January 1965, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations in response to the United States' endorsement of Malaysia's entry to the UN Security Council. Increasing international isolation compelled Sukarno to move another step closer towards the PRC. In 1965, at his last Independence Day ceremony before the 30 September Movement, Sukarno declared: “We are now fostering an anti-imperialist axis – the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis.”³⁴

The Chinese evaluation of Sukarno's position in Indonesian domestic politics was also ambivalent. In 1959, Sukarno replaced constitutional democracy, a system which had suffered from inefficiency, political instability and waning public

31 “Discussions with Singaporean Premier Lee Kuan Yew on the issues of the ‘Malaysia Plan,’ the merger of Singapore and Malaysia and the Singaporean delegation's visit to China,” 23 May 1962, CFMA, 105-01795-01; “Conversations among Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice-Premier Chen Yi and the Indonesian ambassador to China,” 19 March 1964, CFMA, 105-01869-06.

32 “On the issue of Malaysia,” 2 February 1964, CFMA, 110-01696-03.

33 “On the Second Afro-Asian Conference,” 18 September 1962, CFMA, 105-01789-08.

34 Green 1990, 36.

support during the early years of Indonesia's independence, with "guided democracy."³⁵ This new institutional framework was a more authoritarian system largely defined by the delicate power dynamics between Sukarno and the Indonesian army.³⁶ As a result, Sukarno relied heavily on the army's arch-enemy in domestic politics, the PKI, for organized public support. During the later period of "guided democracy" and up until the 30 September Movement, the president's relations with the Indonesian communists became increasingly close, angering the Indonesian army. China became concerned about the possibility of internal unrest in Indonesia owing to the rising tension between the PKI and the Indonesian army and the country's rapidly deteriorating economic situation. In August 1964, the Chinese embassy reported to Beijing that "the right-wing elements and the imperialists were infuriated by Sukarno's turn to the left. They will attempt to topple Sukarno. The conflict between subversion and counter-subversion will become more acute."³⁷ An analytical report written at the end of 1964 suggested that: "Indonesia's national economy has been deteriorating dramatically ... Sukarno is distracting people from the grim economic conditions with the policy of confrontation [with Malaysia]."³⁸ From late October to December 1964, Chinese intelligence agencies in Hong Kong reported on rumours surrounding plots and coups against the government in Indonesia. One intelligence report sent back to Beijing in December 1964 noted that, according to information from the US consulate in Hong Kong, Sukarno's health was in critical condition and that the anti-communist army generals might make a move to seize power.³⁹

Unwanted Embroilment: The PRC and the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia

Aside from its cordial relations with Sukarno, another key to Beijing's honeymoon period with Indonesia was the Chinese central leadership's handling of issues concerning the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Scholars who study the Chinese in South-East Asia usually acknowledge the existence of two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, sub-groups within the Chinese community in Indonesia: the *Peranakan* (Chinese already partially assimilated into Indonesian society) and *Totok* (descendants of comparatively recent immigrants who remain primarily oriented towards their country of origin, China). The PRC dealt mainly, but not exclusively, with the *Totok* groups that maintained strong cultural, linguistic and

35 The very idea of "guided democracy" was probably inspired by Sukarno's visit to China in 1956, during which he was greatly impressed by the progress in China and the effectiveness of the highly centralized political system there. Sukarno promulgated "guided democracy" on 5 May 1959 with a presidential decree. He did not use the term "guided democracy" in the decree, but the substance of this new system was present. On the genealogy of "guided democracy," see Liu 2011. Studies on Indonesian politics during this period include Lev 2009; Legge 1972; Feith 1963.

36 Feith 1963, 323.

37 "Embassy in Jakarta on Sukarno's Independence Day speech," 24 August 1964, CFMA, 105-01233-02.

38 "Reports on Vice-Premier Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia and Burma," 17 December 1964, CFMA, 203-00592-04.

39 "On a possible coup in Indonesia," 30 October–20 December 1964, CFMA, 105-01233-06.

familial ties with China. The following paragraphs discuss how Beijing's policy towards the Chinese in Indonesia was torn between two conflicting goals: first, the PRC had to vie with the Republic of China (ROC) regime in Taiwan for the loyalty of overseas Chinese; and second, it had to assure Jakarta that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were not a "fifth column" for Communist China. When faced with the episodic anti-Chinese riots which had the potential to disrupt PRC–Indonesian relations, Beijing chose to sacrifice the Chinese in Indonesia in order to maintain its alliance with Sukarno.

Given the precarious status of the Chinese in Indonesia, Beijing found managing ties with its diaspora an added diplomatic complication. Despite Indonesia's pronounced ethnic diversity, the Chinese minority were singled out as a distinctive "foreign" (*asing*) ethnic group which had no territorial roots in the country. In other words, the Chinese were not regarded as "indigenous" (*pribumi*) and so did not automatically form part of the post-colonial Indonesian nation, although many of the *Peranakan* Chinese were virtually indistinguishable from the *pribumi* in linguistic or cultural terms. Many Chinese Indonesians found this distinction to be discriminatory and disrespectful. Admittedly, a considerable portion of the Chinese in Indonesia, especially those living in the most densely populated island of Java, achieved business success. However, Chinese throughout the archipelago were engaged in a broad range of occupations and in varied economic conditions. Nevertheless, the Chinese in Indonesia were stereotypically portrayed as a wealthy trading community, rendering this ethnic minority vulnerable to economy envy.⁴⁰

The almost parallel processes of national independence in Indonesia, the establishment of a communist regime in mainland China and the subsequent Kuomintang retreat to Taiwan in 1949 gave rise to the issue of the nationality of Chinese in Indonesia. Under the provisions of the Round Table Agreement of 1949, practically all Indonesian-born Chinese could automatically obtain Indonesian citizenship, or they could establish their status as citizens only of China by formally rejecting Indonesian citizenship within a two-year period. In the early 1950s, around one-third of the total ethnic Chinese population possessed dual nationality.⁴¹ Immediately after the Bandung conference in 1955, China and Indonesia signed the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, which required both countries to cease recognition of dual nationality. Under the terms of this treaty, all Chinese Indonesians aged 18 years and older were forced to choose between either Indonesian or Chinese citizenship.⁴² By 1963, almost all Chinese Indonesians had been sorted into two citizen groups: "WNI" (*Warga Negara Indonesia*) or aliens.⁴³ The latter group consisted almost

40 Coppel 1983, 5–29.

41 Skinner 1962, 18.

42 Research Centre for Diplomatic History at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 1989, 109.

43 Coppel 1983, 38.

entirely of PRC citizens, with the exception of a few Kuomintang loyalists who were registered as “stateless” by the Indonesian immigration authorities.⁴⁴

The implementation of the dual nationality treaty was a tortuous process, which was further obstructed by Beijing’s campaign to gain greater influence than Taipei over the Chinese community in Indonesia. Throughout the 1950s, the PRC used all kinds of resources, including media, government-organized tourist groups and Chinese language education to promote its image as the only legitimate government of China.⁴⁵ After conducting in-depth fieldwork among the Chinese community in Indonesia in the 1950s, William Skinner concluded that the struggle between “Communist and Kuomintang partisans has permeated all levels of Chinese-speaking society and in consequence the China-oriented portion of Chinese society in Indonesia is very highly politicized.”⁴⁶ The heated competition between the two sides came to a temporary halt with the deterioration of Taipei’s relations with Jakarta owing to the former’s support of rebellions in Sulawesi. In 1958, the Indonesian government launched a campaign against Kuomintang organizations in the archipelago, which led to the closure of all schools affiliated with Taipei.⁴⁷

For the PRC, the mobilization of the Chinese in Indonesia was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, beyond expanding political influence, by mobilizing the Chinese community the PRC was able to obtain valuable human resources and information in Indonesia. It is noteworthy that the pro-PRC Chinese language schools were often the cradles for future CCP cadres and PRC diplomats. Many outstanding students found their way into the Chinese civil service and served the PRC with their local knowledge and language skills. For instance, Chen Lishui 陈丽水, Wen Liu 温流 and Huang Shuhai 黄书海 were all Indonesian-born ethnic Chinese who later became the first generation of Indonesian interpreters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC.⁴⁸ On the other hand, many *Totok* Chinese, heavily influenced by Beijing’s propaganda, were reluctant to opt for Indonesian citizenship and to integrate into Indonesian society. In effect, the decade-long spillover of the Chinese civil war in Indonesia

44 In 1950, Indonesia became one of the first countries to grant diplomatic recognition to Communist China. Owing to its “one China” policy, Jakarta had no diplomatic relations with Taipei and thus did not recognize ROC citizenship.

45 For instance, among the major Chinese language newspapers in Indonesia at the time, *Seng Hwo Po* and *Sin Po* were pro-PRC whereas *Thien Sung Yit Po* was pro-ROC. The two sides were involved in a day-to-day propaganda war against each other.

46 Skinner 1962, 4. See also Suryadinata 1972.

47 Mainly opposing the increasing influence of the PKI and the domination of Java, the rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi were supported by the US and its Western allies (UK and Australia). According to Chinese documents, the US supplied the anti-government forces with fighter jets, small and heavy weapons, and gasoline via Taiwan. Military personnel from the ROC were also involved in the training of rebellion troops. See “Minute of Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang and the Indonesian ambassador,” 29 April 1958, CFMA, 105-00366-01.

48 Huang 2008. This book was not an official publication and was presented to me by Mr Huang Shuhai, the editor of the collection and a former diplomat who served as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi’s Indonesian interpreter in the early and mid-1960s. Huang was a progressive student in the Chinese language school in Siantar who was later recruited to serve in the Chinese embassy in Jakarta in 1955. Interviews with former PRC diplomat, Huang Shuhai, Beijing, July 2009 and December 2010.

made it very difficult for the PRC to implement the policy line of encouraging the Chinese to “settle and plant their roots” (*luodi sheng gen* 落地生根) in Indonesia.

The consequences of contradictory policy lines became most pronounced when a wave of economic nationalism rolled over Indonesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In May 1959, two Indonesian government decrees precipitated a turbulent time for the Chinese minority. The first was a Ministry of Trade regulation revoking the trading licences of aliens in rural areas by December 1959, and the second was a decree empowering regional military commanders to remove aliens from their places of residence for “security reasons.”⁴⁹ Six months later, Sukarno promulgated Presidential Decree No. 10 which demanded the suspension of Chinese retailers’ business activities in rural areas by 1 January 1960 and legitimized the takeover of foreign enterprises by indigenous merchants.⁵⁰

The discriminatory economic measures against the Chinese severely disrupted relations between Indonesia and China. In response to Jakarta’s anti-Chinese actions, Beijing chose to adopt a constrained and cautious attitude. The central leadership in Beijing was unwilling to sacrifice stable relations with Sukarno in order to protect the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. During a meeting with the Indonesian ambassador in December 1959, the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, asked the ambassador to pass on the following words to Sukarno: “Vigilance against the imperialists’ conspiracy to impair Afro-Asian unity is very important.”⁵¹ Chen Yi claimed that the rising antagonism towards the PRC in Indonesia was a “cover” (*huangzi* 幌子) for the American plot to overthrow the communist regime in China.⁵² According to Chinese policy makers, the most powerful weapon for crushing the American imperialists’ virulent scheme would be to strengthen Third World unity further.

However, Chinese diplomats on the ground in Indonesia were torn between their duty to serve the PRC’s overall strategic needs and their responsibilities to protect Chinese citizens in Indonesia who relied on the Chinese diplomatic mission for their personal safety and national pride. The Chinese diplomats faced a huge dilemma when Beijing decided to suspend its repatriation programme. Beijing, out of frustration over its inability to resolve the anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia through diplomatic means, began to call back overseas Chinese in December 1959. By the summer of 1960, some 60,000 Chinese had left the country. Beijing had spent approximately US\$40 million on bringing the Chinese home.⁵³ The repatriation programme was prohibitively expensive for China. Around August 1960, the PRC stopped calling back ethnic Chinese from Indonesia and urged potential repatriates to stay in the country. In order

49 Mzingo 1976, 159.

50 Zhou and Kong 2003, 58.

51 “Conversations between Vice-Premier Chen Yi and the Indonesian ambassador to China,” 9 December 1959, CFMA 105-00389-03.

52 Ibid.

53 “Conversations between Deputy Foreign Minister Geng Biao and Indonesian chargé d’affaires ad interim,” 29 November 1960, CFMA, 105-00703-01.

to avoid an outburst of anti-PRC feeling evoked by a sense of betrayal, Beijing instructed its diplomats in Indonesia to “direct the contradictions towards the Indonesian government” through careful “persuasion by cadres.”⁵⁴ Between July and October 1960, the Chinese embassy cancelled 11 merchant fleets booked by Chinese societies in Indonesia for repatriation. The embassy reported that, after repeated instances of “moral education,” the vast majority of the Chinese gathered in Indonesian ports waiting for passage to China had arranged for resettlement in Indonesia. However, by the end of September 1960, over 100,000 Chinese insisted on returning to the PRC even though they were no longer welcome. The Chinese embassy was confronted with emotional protests when Beijing renounced its previous stance on the repatriation campaign. There were large demonstrations against the PRC, and some ethnic Chinese even used threats of collective suicide to intimidate the Chinese diplomats.⁵⁵

The ethnic Chinese issue also served to reinforce Beijing’s already ambivalent attitude towards Sukarno. Sukarno initiated the anti-Chinese campaigns between 1959 and 1960 in a bid to win support from certain indigenous groups that had lost out in business to the ethnic Chinese. Yet, during his meeting with Mao Zedong in 1961, Sukarno declared that he personally thought “there is no ‘ethnic minority’ per se in Indonesia.” He was opposed to “the view that considers ethnic Chinese as minority, but also to the so-called conceptual distinction between ‘aboriginal’ and ‘alien’.” Sukarno took off his hat and pointed out his black hair to Mao: “It is hard to tell whether I am an ‘aboriginal’ or not, perhaps I have Chinese blood in me. Who can tell?”⁵⁶ Despite these friendly gestures, Sukarno continued to use the ethnic Chinese issue as a pawn with which to manipulate Indonesia’s domestic politics. In May 1963, another wave of anti-Chinese riots broke out in Indonesia. Beijing reacted in the same manner as before and adopted a very cautious position, preferring to prioritize its diplomatic relations with Indonesia over the protection of overseas Chinese.

Unlike-minded Comrades: CCP and PKI

The CCP’s connections with the PKI also threatened to disrupt Beijing’s honeymoon period with Jakarta. Owing to the PKI’s initial ambiguous stance on the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing’s attitude towards its Indonesian comrades remained lukewarm throughout the 1950s, and the CCP did not actively pursue any close collaboration with the PKI until the latter had shifted towards a stronger identification with Beijing in 1961. However, Beijing probably had less influence over the PKI than was claimed by the anti-communists in Indonesia after the abortive coup. The Chinese central leadership was informed of, and acquiescent

54 “Confidential attachment: briefings on the enforcement of the ‘more to stay, less to withdraw’ policy,” 18 August 1960, CFMA, 105-00708-02.

55 *Ibid.*

56 “Conversation between Chairman Mao and Indonesian President Sukarno,” 13 June 1961, CFMA, 204-01469-02.

with, the plans for the 30 September Movement. It is highly unlikely, however, that Beijing participated in the planning and subsequent execution of the movement. Nonetheless, by 1967, the People's Republic had become closely identified with the PKI in the eyes of the Suharto regime.

Beijing's evaluation of its Indonesian comrades in 1959 was mixed: "On the one hand, the PKI emphasized independence, autonomy, and equality among communist parties; on the other hand, it confirmed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the vanguard of the international communist movement."⁵⁷ To Beijing, the Indonesian communists were by-and-large "unlike-minded comrades" up until 1961. The PKI had been an independent party which had treasured the autonomy it enjoyed in the international communist movement.⁵⁸ Within the domestic arena, the PKI under Aidit's leadership had rejected the Maoist practice of seizing power by force and was committed to working within the existing political system. The PKI leadership was keenly aware that conditions in China and Indonesia were very different because Indonesia lacked China's great hinterland.⁵⁹

In October 1961, Beijing finally won the PKI's support after years of frustration over the Indonesian communists' policy of remaining neutral in the Sino-Soviet split. At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev's keynote speech, which emphasized de-Stalinization and criticized Albania, was taken by Beijing as an oblique indictment of China.⁶⁰ In Moscow, Aidit refrained from joining Khrushchev in the attack against the Albanian communists with whom the PKI had close contact.⁶¹ Later, Aidit and other members of the Indonesian delegation travelled to Beijing where they held discussions with Mao and other CCP leaders. Mao told Aidit during their meeting: "Khrushchev is so reckless that he can do anything. His tricks change from year to year. There were so many tricks at the CPSU Twenty-second Congress. I think Khrushchev teaches by negative example (*fānmian jiàoyuan* 反面教员)."⁶² Upon his return home, Aidit made a statement in defence of Albania, praising it as a country that was "genuinely building a socialist society."⁶³ At the same time, the PKI asserted that it had the right to evaluate Stalin's contributions according to its own judgment.⁶⁴ In 1963, the PKI summed up its standpoint on inter-communist relations as aligning fully with the CCP "against the

57 "Recent activities of foreign communist parties," 11 May 1959, CFMA, 105-00980-02.

58 The PKI's emphasis on its independence in the international communist movement was highlighted by Rex Mortimer and Ruth T. McVey. See Mortimer 1974, 330–357; McVey 1968.

59 Mortimer 1974, 57.

60 Yang 1999, 536–39.

61 "Recent activities of the PKI (issue 2)," March 1960, CFMA, 105-00980-02.

62 "Conversations between comrade Mao Zedong and General Secretary of the PKI Aidit," 17 November 1961. Quoted in Yang 1999, 551.

63 "Zai huanying Yindunixiya gongchandang daibiaotuan de hui shang Aidi tongzhi tan su gong ershier da" (Comrade Aidit commented on the 22nd CPSU congress at the welcoming reception for the returning PKI delegation), *Renmin ribao*, 1 December 1961.

64 Ibid.

Soviet's 'collaborationist' relationship with the United States."⁶⁵ But, the PKI leadership also emphasized its determination to "pursue its own strategy of peaceful penetration and pressure without regard for Chinese denunciations of the peaceful road to power."⁶⁶

The PKI's attitude encouraged Beijing to take further steps towards forging an alliance with its Indonesian comrades. In September 1963, Aidit was invited to visit China and was hailed as "a brilliant Marxist-Leninist theoretician" and a "close friend and comrade-in-arms of the Chinese people."⁶⁷ Aidit also became the first non-Chinese honorary member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and was invited to give a lecture to the CCP Central Party School. In December 1963, in his political report to the second plenum of the seventh central committee of the PKI, Aidit proposed a theory that the world's countryside would encircle the world's cities. This theory would be incorporated into Lin Biao's 林彪 widely-circulated speech, "Long live the victory of the people's war," two years later.⁶⁸

All these feathers in Aidit's cap reflected both Beijing's recognition of Aidit and the radicalization of China's foreign policy. With its diplomacy irreversibly "turning left," Beijing engaged with the perilous Indonesian political scene shortly before the 30 September Movement. In early 1965, China encouraged Sukarno to establish the Fifth Force, a militia group comprised of armed peasants and workers designed to augment the existing four branches of the Indonesian armed forces (army, navy, air force and police) in the event of an invasion by Malaysia and its British and American allies. Beijing also initiated a military aid programme in an effort to bolster the pro-Sukarno forces (the PKI and air force) against the right-wing elements in the Indonesian army.⁶⁹

Moreover, during a meeting with Chen Yi in Jakarta on 21 August 1965, Subandrio expressed Indonesia's wish to make its own nuclear weapon and requested China's help. A month later, an Indonesian atomic energy delegation went to China and visited research institutes, laboratories and a nuclear reactor.⁷⁰ On 30 September, Mao invited the same Indonesian delegation to attend the PRC National Day celebration: "Now the world is not peaceful, so we need military forces, and moreover, the atomic bomb. Do you want to build an atomic

65 *Harian Rakjat*, 4 October 1963. Quoted in Mortimer 1974, 356–57.

66 *Ibid.*

67 "Yingyao zai Zhonggongzhongyang gaoji dangxiao zuo zhengzhi baogao Aidi tongzhi chanshu Yindunixiya geming jiben wenti" (Comrade Aidit invited to deliver a political report to CCP Central Party School on the basic issues of Indonesian revolution), *Renmin ribao*, 3 September 1963.

68 Aidit 1964; Lin 1965.

69 "Minutes of the meetings between the chief of the PLA General Staff Luo Ruiqing and the military personnel from the Indonesian delegation," 27 January 1965, CFMA, 105-01910-07; "Meeting between Chairman Mao Zedong and Indonesian First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio," 27 January 1965, CFMA, 105-01910-04; and "Ambassador Yao Zhongming meets with Subandrio," 11 February 1965, CFMA, 105-01319-05.

70 "Briefings on the visit of Indonesian atomic energy group of the Indonesian economic delegation," 18–29 September 1965, CFMA, 105-01323-02.

bomb?”⁷¹ After hearing an affirmative answer from the head of the delegation, Mao said: “Two big countries in the world want to monopolize nuclear power, but we won’t listen to them. We still create our own.”⁷² During that meeting, Mao emphasized to the Indonesian guests that China had only just started its own nuclear industry, and that Indonesia should, first and foremost, develop its agriculture and industries.⁷³ It is probable that China was interested in the transfer of nuclear technology to Indonesia, but no substantial commitment was made before the 30 September Movement.

China’s involvement in Indonesian domestic politics made its role in the coup highly suspicious. Evidence from the Chinese side suggests that the top Chinese leadership in Beijing was probably aware of the PKI’s plan to thwart the anti-communist army generals from making the move to seize power. However, the PKI most probably made its plan independently of foreign influence. From November 1964 to September 1965, Sukarno’s health, especially his kidney stones, became a highly politicized issue. Since the PKI relied heavily upon Sukarno’s political support, the party was haunted by the scenario in which its long-time nemesis, the Indonesian army, would take the chance to seize power from Sukarno. On 5 August 1965, Aidit, who was visiting China at the time, brought forward his plans to return to Indonesia because Sukarno had suffered a severe cerebral vasospasm attack the day before. Before leaving Beijing, Aidit had his last meeting with Mao. When Mao asked what the PKI would do in the event of Sukarno’s death and if the army would attempt to seize power, Aidit laid out a plan for a pre-emptive strike:

[W]e plan to establish a military committee. The majority of that committee would be left wing but it should also include some middle elements. In this way, we could confuse our enemies. Our enemies would be uncertain about the nature of this committee, and therefore the military commanders who are sympathetic to the right wing will not oppose us immediately. If we show our red flag right away, they will oppose us right away. The head of this military committee would be an underground member of our party, but he would identify himself as a neutral. This military committee should not last for too long. Otherwise, good people will turn to bad people. After it has been established, we need to arm the workers and peasants in a timely fashion.⁷⁴

As described above, Aidit’s plan was a fairly accurate prediction of what would actually happen in less than two months’ time. Furthermore, the hypothesis that a clandestine bureau of the PKI was responsible for the movement is supported by arguments presented in John Roosa’s research, which is built upon in-depth study of Indonesian and American materials.⁷⁵

71 “Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong, Chairman Liu Shaoqi and the Indonesian delegation,” 30 September 1965, CFMA, 105-01917-02.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 “Chairman Mao meets the delegation of the PKI,” Chinese Communist Party Central Archives, 5 August 1965. This document is drawn from a collection entitled “Minutes of meetings between Chairman Mao and leaders of various communist parties,” which was circulated internally among a group of senior Chinese scholars who had access to the CCP central archives. I thank Professor Chen Jian for generously sharing this document.

75 Roosa 2006.

Despite its prior knowledge of the plans for the 30 September Movement, the Chinese central leadership seemed ill-prepared for the dramatic turn of events on 1 and 2 October. The CCP newspaper, *People's Daily*, did not report on the incident during the first two weeks after it happened. The silence was finally broken on 19 October when, owing to the Chinese embassy's refusal to lower its national flag to half-mast on the national memorial day to commemorate the army generals killed in the abortive coup, violent conflicts broke out in Jakarta between the embassy and the Indonesian army.⁷⁶ From October to November 1965, the Chinese central leadership was still harbouring hopes that Aidit would carry out an armed insurgency and regain control over the situation. In talks with the North Korean premier in November 1965, Zhou Enlai claimed that Beijing received little information from its diplomatic mission in Jakarta, but that the Chinese leadership believed that "the PKI was most resolute in the battle against imperialists and revisionists. It would be able to survive this test ... the situation would be clearer once the PKI begins its counter attack."⁷⁷ In December 1965, upon learning of the death of Aidit, who was gunned down in Central Java by Suharto's troops, Mao wrote a poem:

Sparse branches stood in front of my windows in winter, smiling before hundreds of flowers
 Regretfully those smiles withered when spring came
 There is no need to grieve over the withered
 To each flower there is a season to wither, as well a season to blossom
 There will be more flowers in the coming year.⁷⁸

The poem shows Mao's confidence in a revival of the communist movement in Indonesia. Yet, with Mao relentlessly launching his "last revolution" at home while Suharto tightened his grip on political power through an equally relentless cleansing of communists in Indonesia, China's policy towards Indonesia turned to one of extreme hostility. On the ground in Indonesia, the radicalization of Chinese diplomacy was rapidly advanced by the chargé d'affaires, Yao Dengshan 姚登山, a fervent leftist who enjoyed short-lived fame as a "red fighter diplomat" during the Cultural Revolution.⁷⁹ In the spring of 1966, Beijing started to oppose the Suharto regime openly after right-wing student groups and the Indonesian army attacked the Chinese embassy in April. In a Beijing hospital whilst visiting a diplomat who had been shot by the Indonesian army during a violent clash, Chen Yi said: "The imperialists and the reactionaries fired at our

76 "Yindunixiya wuzhuang budui xiji soucha wo shangwu canzan chu shi dui woguo de ji yanzhong tiaoxin. Zhongguo zhengfu xiang Yindunixiya zhengfu tichu qianglie kangyi" (Indonesian army's surprise attack and ransacking of our commercial attaché's office is dangerously provocative. The Chinese government issues strong protests), *Renmin ribao*, 19 October 1965.

77 "Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Vice-Prime Minister Chen Yi's second meeting with the Vice-Prime Minister of North Korea," 11 November 1965, CFMA, 106-01476-06.

78 Mao 1965.

79 "Hongse wajiao zhanshi Yao Dengshan, Xu Ren fenu qianze Yinni fandong pai fengkuang fan hua pai hua taotian zuixing" (Red fighter diplomat Yao Dengshan, Xu Ren, furiously condemned the horrifying crimes against China and the Chinese in Indonesia by the reactionary government), *Renmin ribao*, 14 May 1967.

comrades ... the blood debts need to be paid back with blood!”⁸⁰ Bilateral relations were officially suspended in October 1967.

Conclusion

During the Sino-Indonesian honeymoon period between 1960 and 1965, the Chinese central leadership made a great effort to form a strategic alliance with Indonesia in order to undermine the influence of the United States and Soviet Union in South-East Asia. Indonesia was important to the PRC’s “intermediate zone” strategy targeted at Asian, African and Latin American countries. With its unique combination of a friendly non-communist government, sizable overseas Chinese communities and large communist party, Indonesia provided China with an unusually good chance of pulling off a major Cold War breakthrough. On the macro-level, Beijing’s Indonesia policy is a case that demonstrates well the radicalization of Chinese foreign policy in the first half of the 1960s. China denied any possibility for long-term peace and stability in the international system and vehemently condemned the Soviets’ pursuit of détente with the United States. This general strategic thinking left little room for pragmatism and flexibility at the operational level of Chinese diplomacy in Indonesia.

On the micro-level, despite Beijing’s efforts to cultivate a sense of Afro-Asian solidarity with Sukarno, its connections with the overseas Chinese and the PKI prevented it from legitimately pursuing its cause. Beijing maintained close ties with Indonesia’s Chinese community, an ethnic minority with a precarious political and economic position in the post-colonial South-East Asian state. China was also actively engaged with the Indonesian communists, who were in the ascendant until the fatal moves of the 30 September Movement. In spite of the Chinese leadership’s accommodating attitude towards anti-Chinese movements and its limited control over the PKI, China nevertheless came to represent simultaneously both capitalist exploiter in the Indonesian economy and communist interventionist in Indonesian politics. Thus, in the Indonesian context, China, as a foreign nation state, was an outsider; yet it was also involved in the internal affairs of Indonesia as the motherland of the predominantly business-minded ethnic Chinese and as a “comrade” of the PKI. This blurring of insider–outsider statuses, and the subsequent paradoxical representations of China as the sponsor of both Chinese capitalists and Indonesian communists, put considerable pressure on the ambivalent alliance between Beijing and Jakarta between 1960 and 1965, and finally led to its collapse in 1967.

By tracing the processes by which Chinese foreign policy decision makers and practitioners dealt with Sukarno, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and the PKI, this article has demonstrated that the ambivalent Chinese alliance with

80 “Chen Yi tongzhi daibiao zhongyang, Mao zhuxi he guowuyuan weiyuan Zhao Xiaoshou tongzhi” (Comrade Chen Yi visited comrade Zhao Xiaoshou on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP, Chairman Mao, and State Council), *Shijie zhishi*, September 1966.

Indonesia was shaped by three disparate pressures which interacted and competed with one another: the strategic need to befriend Third World countries; the ethnic ties with the overseas Chinese; and ideological commitment to the international communist movement. China's equivocal policy towards Indonesia was also a reflection of the co-existing, and sometimes conflicting, ways in which the PRC identified itself during the Cold War along the lines of anti-colonialism, vis-à-vis the territorially dispersed Chinese communities, and through communist ideology. By showing how the Chinese living in Indonesia became involved in bilateral relations, this article makes a preliminary attempt to bridge political leaders' decision making in international diplomacy and overseas Chinese actions in transnational movements. Given the still delicate position of the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesian politics, lessons from the Cold War may continue to inform Beijing's interaction with the archipelago today.

摘要: 1960年代初期,对美苏主导的世界体制的不满和在既有国际关系框架外开辟新天地的愿望把中国与印尼紧密地联合在了一起。双方频繁的高层互访,密切的党际交往以及经济、文化、教育和卫生等全方面的双边合作在1965年印尼“九·三〇运动”前夕达到高潮。但与此同时,印尼社会曾分别在1960年和1965年两次爆发大规模排华浪潮。时至今日,学界对这一段动荡时期内中国对印尼政策的形成和演变仍然缺乏全面的了解。本文是利用北京方面公开外交档案探索中国对印尼政策轨迹的首批学术论文之一。本文认为中国对印尼政策在三个向度上存在着不同的意义:由于印尼是重要的亚非新兴民族国家,苏加诺本人更是“新兴力量”这一概念的提出者,中国对印尼政策是其建立国际统一战线战略的具体体现;由于华人与原住民之间因经济地位、文化认同与政治忠诚感差异形成的、历史因袭而来的矛盾,华侨问题成为中国对印尼政策必不可少的组成部分;由于印尼共产党在其国内政治中的特殊地位,中国对印尼政策又不可避免地要承载国际共产主义运动动荡、分裂的冲击力。

关键词: 中国与印度尼西亚关系;冷战时期政府间外交;第三世界;海外华人华侨;国际共产主义运动

References

- Aidit, D.N. 1964. *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat!* Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Anderson, Benedict Richard O'Gorman, and Ruth T. McVey. 1971. *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications.
- Brackman, Arnold. 1969. *Communist Collapse in Indonesia*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Chen, Jian. 2001. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Coppel, Charles A. 1983. *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

- Cribb, Robert. 2004. "The Indonesian massacres." In Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel W. Charny (eds.), *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge, 233–262.
- Cribb, Robert, and Charles A. Coppel. 2009. "A genocide that never was: explaining the myth of anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia, 1965–66." *Journal of Genocide Research* 11(4), 447–465.
- Crouch, Harold. 1978. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Dake, Antonie C.A. 1973. *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking, 1959–1965*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Feith, Herbert. 1963. "Dynamics of guided democracy." In Ruth T. McVey (ed.), *Indonesia*. New Heaven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, by arrangement with HRAF Press, 309–355.
- Fic, Victor M. 2004. *Anatomy of the Jakarta Coup, October 1, 1965*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- Green, Marshal. 1990. *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965–1968*. Washington, D.C.: The Compass Press.
- Harsono, Ganis. 1977. *Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era*. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.
- Howie, Robert P.L. 1968. "Sino-Indonesian Relations, October 1965–April 1967." PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Huang, Shuhai. 2008. *Xianda zhaopian (Pictures from Siantar)*. Beijing: published with aid from Hongwen Foundation.
- Kuhn, Philip A. 2008. *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Legge, J.D. 1972. *Sukarno: A Political Biography*. New York: Praeger.
- Lev, Daniel S. 2009. *The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1957–1959*. Jakarta: Equinox.
- Lin, Biao. 1965. *Long Live the Victory of the People's War! In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Liu, Hong. 2011. *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949–1965*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Luthi, Lorenz M. 2008. *The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956–1966: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mao, Zedong. 1965. "Pusuanzi dao guoji gongchanzhuyi zhanshi Aidi tongzhi" (*In Memory of Comrade Aidit, An International Communist Fighter*), December 1965, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/70190/70199/4763391.html>. Accessed 20 July 2008.
- Mao, Zedong. 1971[1946]. "Talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong." In *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao TseTung*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 345–351.
- McKeown, Adam. 2001. *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McKeown, Adam. 2008. *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McVey, Ruth T. 1968. "Indonesian communism and China." In Tang Tsou (ed.), *China's Politics in Asia and America's Alternatives* (Vol. 2). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 357–394.
- Mortimer, Rex. 1974. *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Mozingo, David. 1976. *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949–1967*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Niu, Jun. 2005. "1962: the eve of the left turn in China's foreign policy." Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 48, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Oyen, Meredith. 2010. "Communism, containment and the Chinese overseas." In Yangwen Zheng, Hong Liu and Michael Szonyi (eds.), *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds*. Boston: Brill, 59–94.
- Pan, Lynn. 1990. *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Research Centre for Diplomatic History at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. 1989. *Zhou Enlai wajiao huodong dashiji (The Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Activities in Foreign Affairs)*. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Roosa, John. 2006. *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'État in Indonesia*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Shen, Zhihua, and Danhui Li. 2011. *After Learning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Simon, Sheldon W. 1969. *The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
- Skinner, G. William. 1962. *Communism and Chinese Culture in Indonesia: The Political Dynamics of the Chinese Youth*. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- Sukma, Rizal. 1999. *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*. London: Routledge.
- Suryadinata, Leo. 1972. "Indonesian Chinese education: past and present." *Indonesia* 14, 49–71.
- Suryadinata, Leo. 2007. *Understanding the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Tan, Chee Beng. 2004. *Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Tong, Xiaopeng. 1996. *Fengyu sishinian (Forty Years in All Weathers)* (Vol. 2). Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Tsai, Yen-ling, and Douglas Kammen. 2012. "Anti-communist violence and the ethnic Chinese in Medan, North Sumatra." In Douglas Kammen and Katherine McGregor (eds.), *Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia: 1965–1968*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 131–155.
- Wang, Gungwu. 1991. *China and the Chinese Overseas*. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
- Westad, Odd Arne. 2000. "The new international history of the Cold War: three (possible) paradigms." *Diplomatic History* 24(4), 551–565.
- Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, Lea E. 1962. "Sino-Indonesian diplomacy: a study of revolutionary international politics." *The China Quarterly* 11, 184–199.
- Wu, Lengxi. 1999. *Shinian lunzhan (A Decade of Debate)* (Vol. 1). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Yang, Kuisong. 1999. *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enenyuan (Amity and Enmity between Mao Zedong and Moscow)*. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe.
- Zhou, Nanjing, and Zhiyuan Kong. 2003. *Sujianuo Zhongguo Yindunixiya huaren (Sukarno, China and the Chinese Minority in Indonesia)*. Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe.