



## Dairy and diaspora: postponed reform on the guangming overseas Chinese farm of Shenzhen

Zhou Taomo

To cite this article: Zhou Taomo (2023) Dairy and diaspora: postponed reform on the guangming overseas Chinese farm of Shenzhen, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 24:4, 708-722, DOI: 10.1080/14649373.2023.2221499

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2023.2221499>



Published online: 19 Jul 2023.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 17



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



## Dairy and diaspora: postponed reform on the guangming overseas Chinese farm of Shenzhen

ZHOU Taomo

History Programme, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

### ABSTRACT

In 1973, four cows and one bull were shipped to Guangming Farm, an agricultural production base for China to supply fresh produce to British Hong Kong. The cattle's human caretakers included Malayan, Indonesian, and Vietnamese Chinese expelled from Southeast Asia due to local ethnonationalist policies. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Guangming was a state-directed productive space with prominent features of the planned economy, ironically installed when the rest of Shenzhen and China was embarking on market reform. The reform of Guangming Farm lagged the marketization in Shenzhen and did not begin in earnest until the early 2000s. This essay explains how the delay in reform ultimately served the state's interests. The People's Republic of China mobilized Southeast Asian refugee labor to grow international trade and expand state capital. In this process, the diasporic Chinese became, simultaneously, the agents and targets of Deng Xiaoping's reform.

### KEYWORDS

Special economic zone; migration; citizenship; urbanization; state-owned enterprise (SOE); agriculture

In 1973, four cows and one bull were shipped from New Zealand to a farm north of China's border with Hong Kong (PCDC 2019, 202). The cattle were not the only migrants at their new home, Guangming Farm (*guangming* means “bright” in Chinese), an agricultural production base from which socialist China supplied fresh produce to British Hong Kong. The cows' and bull's human neighbors and caretakers included earlier immigrants—Malayan and Indonesian Chinese expelled from Southeast Asia due to local anti-communist politics and ethnonationalist economic policies. In 1978–1979, the bovine and human settlers were joined by more than 4,300 ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam, who were displaced due to geopolitical conflicts between the two countries (OCACSZ 2012, 244). The new arrivals doubled the existing population on the farm and elevated its status to an “overseas Chinese farm,” a title which resulted in favorable policies from the central and provincial governments and financial aid from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (PCDC 2019, 38).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Guangming was a state-directed productive space with prominent features of the planned economy, ironically installed as the rest of Shenzhen and China was embarking on market reform. In China, the overseas Chinese farms were enclaves carved out of local territories, their creation and expansion influenced by Cold War geopolitics and China's relations with Southeast Asia (Han 2013, 34). Shenzhen, China's first and most successful special

economic zone, was also an enclave where market-oriented policies were tested before being introduced into the core of the socialist economy. The Chinese Vietnamese refugees migrated from one frontier between two warring socialist countries to another frontier between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and capitalist Hong Kong. In Shenzhen, the forefront of China's reform, these migrants lived in a special zone within a special zone, where the state, rather than the market, served as the main provider of their livelihood.

This essay, with its focus on everyday economic life on Guangming Farm, discusses how diasporic Chinese from Southeast Asia became, simultaneously, the agents and targets of Deng Xiaoping's reform. The reform of Guangming Farm lagged far behind the marketization in Shenzhen and did not begin in earnest until the early 2000s. This essay shows that the delay in reform ultimately served the state's interests. The PRC mobilized Southeast Asian refugee labor to grow international trade and expand state capital. The institutionalization of repatriated diasporic Chinese within the state system guaranteed a steady supply of disciplined labor and, thus, helped boost the market competitiveness of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that evolved from the overseas Chinese farm. The capital accumulated through the early reform period laid the foundation for the industrial upgrading of the SOEs in the mid-2000s. As urbanization progressed, agriculture sectors moved inland, and Guangming reoriented itself toward technological sectors, the community of the "returned" overseas Chinese—despite their relative economic stability—became gradually marginalized on the drastically transformed farm.

### Reassessing China's reform from a diasporic perspective

In this essay, I call the Malayan, Indonesian and Vietnamese Chinese on Guangming Farm "the returnees" (*guiqiao* in Chinese), treating them as migrants who "returned" to their ancestral homeland even if they themselves had not lived in mainland China previously. They did not fit into the common understanding of either overseas Chinese or domestic migrants in early reform-era China. As Glen Peterson observed, "Chinese outside mainland China, in particular those in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, have played an important role" in China's reform and opening (2011, 169–170). Impressed by the economic success of the Chinese living overseas during his trips to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok in the late 1970s, Deng drew two conclusions: first, China needed to replicate the export-oriented economic growth he observed in Southeast Asia by creating "special economic zones" on China's south coast; second, China needed to invite the Chinese from overseas to "work the same economic miracle in China" through investment (Peterson 2011, 169–170). In this context, the diaspora members most desired by the Chinese state and most discussed in existing scholarship were those who could provide "the capital and expertise to fuel China's economic takeoff" (Ong 1997, 174).

The transnational Chinese capitalists also played "nodal and pivotal roles" in developing Asia's export-oriented economies and in the proliferation of precarious workers (Nonini and Ong 1997, 11). In the 1970s, the Reagan–Thatcher revolution of deregulation and privatization drove Western corporations to the developing world in search of lower labor costs and less onerous tax burdens (Chen 1995; Neveling 2015). Against this backdrop of globalization of production, many late-developing countries, most prominently the Asian Tigers, adopted export-oriented strategies to achieve rapid industrialization. From Kaohsiung, Taiwan to Mae Sot on the Thai–Burmese border, and from Singapore to Shenzhen, export processing zones with relaxed taxation and labor regulation laws emerged. Local governments deployed the strategy of "graduated sovereignty," in which variegated labor policies were implemented for different segments of the population to increase

profitability in the international market (Campbell 2018; Ong 2000). These “zoning technologies” resulted in “an insecure, floating workforce” with low wages, a high turnover rate, and “limited benefits and statutory entitlements” (Vosko 2010, 2). As south China emerged as the world’s manufacturing hub, the PRC used the *hukou* (household registration) system, which created a rigid socio-legal boundary between urban and rural residents, to regulate the massive young rural labor force released from agricultural de-collectivization (Solinger 1999; Zhang 2018, 862–863). Ordinarily, the term “migrant” in the Shenzhen context evokes an image of migrant workers with rural residence status who drove China’s unprecedented economic growth but were denied resources for social reproduction in the city.

Unlike both groups of stereotypical diaspora members and migrants, the Guangming returnees occupy a unique place in China’s system of uneven citizenship. In the early reform era, they were underprivileged individuals *without* financial capital but a privileged migrant labor force *with* stable employment and social welfare. This curious case of diasporic Chinese as state-employed workers rather than offshore investors reveals the varied roles played by the Southeast Asian diaspora in China’s reform and opening, the complex meaning of citizenship in post-socialist states, and the connection between international and internal migrations. Although many returnees had been naturalized abroad or acquired citizenship in a foreign country at birth, they were granted PRC citizenship on both national political and local social levels, making them entitled to rights of political participation as well as state-sponsored welfare benefits and public services (Smart and Smart 2001). The inclusion the returnees enjoyed stood in contrast to the exclusion the rural-to-urban migrants faced, as the latter became “virtual foreigners within the cities of their own country” because of their lack of or restricted access to healthcare, education, housing, and other social rights in the city (Solinger 1999, 4).

Throughout China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, the Guangming returnees were a social group situated in between “native” and foreign, urban and rural, the peasant class and the working class. Their experiences have broader implications for the evolving regimes governing international and internal mobility in transitional societies. If the Mao-era urban–rural dichotomy made urban industrial workers the “first-class citizens” and the peasants the “second-class citizens,” the returnees fell somewhere between the two classes (Han 2013, 39). In the twilight of state socialism, the returnees on the farm received various social benefits and protections which were usually tied to work units in the city during the Mao era. Yet as the market reform deepened, welfare provision to the returnees receded. Internationally, “the Chinese state’s subsequent diaspora strategies prioritized scientific and managerial skills and economic contributions to advance national development” (Ho 2018, 14–15). Internally, China’s mobility regime shifted from one that strictly controlled rural-to-urban movement to a neoliberal style of governance that privileged the movement of economic elites while displacing or immobilizing those deemed detrimental to the cities’ development into globally competitive economic spaces (Zhang 2018). Forty years after their resettlement, the Guangming returnees—the majority of whom received no university education—have slipped to the periphery of Shenzhen’s metropolitan development.

Interwoven with the returnees’ movements across international borders and in the social hierarchy within China was the transformation of agriculture in Shenzhen. After the returnees’ resettlement in the Shenzhen–Hong Kong borderland, food production and consumption had been the prime mechanism through which they formulated a relationship with the Chinese state, forged amalgamated identities, and simultaneously constructed and crossed economic, social and cultural boundaries. An invisible border divided the culinary scene on the Guangming farm into industrially produced, “culturally odorless” food to supply the market and homecooked, “ethnic”

Vietnamese food for the returnees' own consumption (Thomas 2004, 63). On one hand, the returnees earned welfare entitlements through their labor in producing homogenized food such as milk and other dairy products. On the other hand, they facilitated cultural exchanges with local Cantonese and Hakka villagers and sustained the emotional ties to Vietnam among themselves and the younger generation through cooking and eating Southeast Asian food. On the micro level, food served as a marker of cultural identities, a social cement, and a medium of memory among the repatriated diaspora (Anderson 1988, 244–246; Chan 2012; Thomas 2004); on the macro level, the returnees' experiences through reform were shaped by structural changes in China's dairy industry and Shenzhen's urban economy.

### From military farm to refugee settlement: 1958 to the late 1970s

Guangming Farm had its origins in military farms during the Mao era. As part of state-directed migrant settlement patterns in postcolonial countries during the Cold War, military farms served the purposes of population control, frontier strengthening, and social engineering strategy (Amrith 2011, 133 and 140). In the words of James C. Scott, military farms could be considered “state spaces” —where populations were open to order, planning, surveillance, and control—created according to the ideology of “high modernism” (Scott 1998, 4 and 191).

In 1958, the Agricultural and Reclamation Department of Guangdong Province established Guangming Farm on 156.1 square kilometers of virgin land located in the northwestern region of Bao'an County, the geographical predecessor of today's Shenzhen. Under Mao, Bao'an was on the margin of the socialist political economy; Guangming Farm was located on a margin of the margin, known as the “Siberia” of Bao'an (PCDC 2019, 32). Nevertheless, the provincial authorities saw the potential for Guangming to fortify China's border with British Hong Kong, earn foreign currencies through export, and consolidate the sovereignty and improve the international image of the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government. Despite its revolutionary discourse, Beijing tolerated the continuation of British colonial rule in Hong Kong. Beijing and London reached an implicit mutual understanding to maintain the status quo in Hong Kong, so as to benefit the financial and geopolitical stability of the Asia-Pacific region (Carroll 2007, 135–136; Mark 2007, 1154). In this context, Beijing intended to win the hearts and minds of its “Hong Kong compatriots” by constructing an agricultural production base along the Kowloon–Canton railroad to supply Hong Kong with fruits, vegetables, cow's milk, and meat.

Guangming's political and economic significance as a source of food supply to Hong Kong led to a period of military control of farm life. Between 1961 and 1964, the Guangzhou Military Region (now the Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army, PLA) took over the management of Guangming; PLA officers became the leaders of local production teams. In 1964, Shahe Farm, a food production base for the Guangzhou Military Region located on the west coast of Shenzhen, merged with Guangming to become a single administrative unit. Organizationally, Shahe became a subsidiary of the Guangming Farm. In 1965, the management of the Guangming Farm was returned to the civilian government of Bao'an County (PCDC 2019, 33 and 37). According to official history, this period of military control led to the continuous presence of a disciplined militia, which maintained social order and prevented vandalism on the farm during the Cultural Revolution (PCDC 2019, 68–69).

Since the mid-twentieth century, Guangming had been a melting pot with migrants from near and far. The domestic migrants who first arrived at Guangming in the late 1950s included more than 1000 “southbound” CCP cadres (*nanxia ganbu*) and young people recruited from other

parts of Guangdong. These pioneers used the slash-and-burn method to claim land for agricultural production. During the Cultural Revolution, these early settlers were joined by “sent-down youth” (*zhishi qingnian*)—mostly teenagers with parents working in the railroad and postal systems in Guangdong (PCDC 2019, 35–38). Beyond the territorial boundaries of China, between 1949 and 1977, Guangming accepted 163 returnees from Malaya and Indonesia (OCACSZ 2012, 244). Most deportees from Malaya were members or sympathizers of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The former chairperson of the Returned Overseas Chinese Association (*guiguo huaqiao lianhe hui*) of Guangming, Luo Huanrong, was born in 1938 in Kuala Lumpur. In his own words, “As a little devil of the MCP (Magong xiaogui), [I] was captured by the British devils due to naughty sabotages and sent back to China in 1949” (PCDC 2019, 56).

From 1978 to 1979, the arrival of 4349 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam marked a turning point in the history of Guangming (OCACSZ 2012, 244). The previous “brother plus comrade” partnership between Hanoi and Beijing had deteriorated, and bilateral conflicts escalated into a border war in 1979, causing between 430,000 and 700,000 ethnic Chinese to leave Vietnam under duress. Approximately 160,000 were resettled on 86 overseas Chinese farms in the Chinese provinces, including Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Yunnan, and Jiangxi (Chang 1982, 230; Han 2014, 198; Kong 2008; Quinn-Judge 2006, 237). The newly arrived Chinese coming from Vietnam changed the demographics and status of Guangming. As the returnees became the overwhelming majority of the farm residents, in 1979 Guangming Farm was renamed “Guangdong State-Owned Guangming Overseas Chinese Livestock Farm” (*Guangdong sheng Guangming Huaqiao xumu chang*) and was placed under the direct administration of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAC) of the State Council in Beijing and its subordinate office in Guangdong Province (PCDC 2019, 146).

Compared with the earlier batches of migrants from Malaya and Indonesia, the returnees from Vietnam received more economically favorable treatment from the PRC government due to their internationally recognized refugee status. Other Southeast Asian Chinese embroiled in decolonization conflicts were often viewed by local political elites as proxies of Beijing’s communist expansionist scheme. In the ideologically charged Cold War climate, the PRC government took the sole responsibility for assimilating this displaced diaspora group, despite the prohibitive costs of repatriation and resettlement, to demonstrate its “co-ethnic fraternity” with the global Chinese diasporic communities and to shore up its international prestige (Ho 2018, 18). However, by the time of the Indochinese refugee crisis, the Sino–United States rapprochement and the PRC’s recovery of its seat at the United Nations (UN) had created room for China to collaborate with the UNHCR, which opened its first office in Beijing in 1980. Two years later, China signed the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol, which allowed China to receive international financial assistance for the Indochinese refugees (Song 2018, 144–145).<sup>1</sup> For instance, the UNHCR funded housing construction and the Vocational Training Center at Guangming (PCDC 2019, 184–185).

Keenly aware of their rights as refugees, the returnees from Vietnam, particularly city dwellers and those from southern Vietnam, proactively engaged in active negotiation with or passive resistance against the PRC. They understood that they had more leverage than returnees from Malaya and Indonesia because “they could expect assistance from not only China, but also other countries; they could resettle not only in China, but also in countries more advanced than China” (Han 2014, 208–209). Careful to avoid rebellious elements, cadres of Guangming’s OCAC made efforts to recruit mostly peasants from northern Vietnam who were familiar with agricultural work (PCDC 2019, 151). According to statistics compiled by local authorities in 1979, most of the refugees at Guangming were farmers and fishers from the north, and a minority were factory and office workers and merchants from southern Vietnam (OCACSZ 2012, 244). Approximately 4,100



returnees used Chinese dialects as their primary language, whereas 144 returnees were highly assimilated Hoa people who spoke only Vietnamese. Another 46 were ethnic Vietnamese who came with their spouses (RROGM 1979b).

In 1978–1979, the difficult housing conditions and demanding labor discipline on the farm caused much discontent among the returnees from Vietnam, driving 104 new settlers to attempt illegal migration to Hong Kong; 13 of them succeeded (RROGM 1979b). On their way from the Sino–Vietnamese border to Guangming, foot-dragging was a common resistance strategy. Some refused to leave the provincial capital, Guangzhou, because they did not want to “live among the cows” in remote Guangming; others refused to disembark from the vehicle upon their arrival at Guangming (PCDC 2019, 152; RROGM 1978a). In 1978, 54 returnees secretly purchased a boat at the cost of 2500 RMB in the hope of sailing to Hong Kong, but their plan was revealed to the farm’s management (RROGM 1978b). Housing shortages caused by the sudden population increase on the farm were a major source of dissatisfaction among the Vietnamese returnees, many of whom lived in cramped, derelict apartments with large extended families. Despite the funding from the Chinese government and the UNHCR, construction materials were in short supply due to the high demand for infrastructure building in Shenzhen (RROGM 1979a).

Moreover, some returnees from the Vietnamese cities resented the “quota system” on the farm, according to which they were required to meet agricultural production targets to earn a base salary and could then earn bonuses for additional outputs. Some tried to evade manual labor altogether and told the Guangming cadres that “Chairman Hua (Guofeng) and the UN promised to support us for half a year” and “we can enjoy life for one year without working” (RROGM 1978b). The push of hard work and harsh living conditions on the farm was compounded by the pull of economic prosperity, political freedom, and consumerism in Hong Kong, as information about the British colony was transmitted by radio communications across the border and in letters and remittances from friends and relatives of the refugees who resettled there (RROGM 1978a).

After the initial disturbances, the population outflow from the farm stopped around 1980. Because of its proximity to Hong Kong, Bao’an during the socialist era was a major transit stop for outbound—usually illegal—Chinese migration. “In the late 1970s, Bao’an was at the center of a large-scale migrant crisis. From 1978 to 1980, the Guangdong provincial government reported almost 500,000 cases of illegal emigration, one-fifth of which were committed by Bao’an residents” (Zhou 2021, 353). The stakes for the Vietnamese refugees seeking to flee China were much lower than for ordinary Bao’an residents because the former group’s internationally recognized refugee status protected them against the implementation of harsh punitive measures against illegal migration by the Chinese government. It therefore seems counter-intuitive that the proportion of illegal migration attempts was much higher among the Bao’an locals (100,000 among 330,000 individuals) than among the returnees (104 among 4,349).

Along with the returnees’ lack of familiarity with the local geography and limited social connections in Hong Kong, an important reason for the comparatively low rate of illegal emigration among the refugees was the comparatively high living standards on the farm. The Guangming farm bordered Cantonese and Hakka settlements with strong clan networks. A small number of clans, such as the Huangs and Chens from Xinmei and Zhenmei villages, collectively decided to join the Guangming Farm, whereas the majority chose to maintain their autonomy (PCDC 2019, 84–86). Life on the farm and in neighboring villages involved different sets of obligations to and benefits from the state. Although peasants had the freedom to collectively administer their own land, they were not eligible to receive stable salaries, subsidized housing, free medical care, or pensions, all of which the farm employees enjoyed. These privileges were available

exclusively to urban dwellers employed by industrial units during the Mao era. The peasants therefore often referred to the Guangming returnees as “the working class who grow crops” (*zhong zhuangjia de gongren jieji*) (interviews conducted by the author via Wechat, 22 and 23 September 2021).

### Milking the border: the 1980s to the 2000s

For the refugees from Vietnam who stayed on at Guangming, their lives became intertwined with those of earlier migrants in their joint efforts to develop export-oriented agriculture, most importantly a modern dairy industry. In the context of China–Hong Kong trade, milk production was concentrated in Guangming while consumption occurred in Hong Kong. As Veronica Mak discussed in her anthropological study of the milk culture in Asia, in socialist China, milk had been a scarce commodity reserved for newborns, the super-privileged, or those who were chronically sick (Mak 2021, 82–83; see also Hu 2020, 88). Until the 1990s, although Guangming was the primary source of high-protein products such as milk and meat, its people did not have easy access to these high-value food items, which were reserved for export. Thus, the geopolitical border signified a social boundary and reflected the wide socioeconomic gap between Hong Kong and mainland China at the time. As Glen Peterson observed, the Chinese socialist states’ exploitation of refugee labor was a common phenomenon across overseas Chinese farms. The valuable goods they produced—such as rubber, jute, and milk—made a significant contribution to China’s national economy by generating foreign currency through state-organized export (Peterson 2011, 116–117).

In 1973, General Wang Zhen, the Minister of Agriculture and Reclamation, gave Guangming the gift of four milk cows and one bull imported from New Zealand. In 1975, Guangming began supplying Hong Kong with fresh milk, and soon it became the largest supplier of the Hong Kong market (PCDC 2019, 202). The imported cows were expensive assets on the farm and received VIP treatment from their caretakers, who worked hard to help them adjust to the hot and humid subtropical climate. Many Vietnamese refugees were tasked with cultivating carrots and cabbages as cow feed; others were organized into three shifts to provide around-the-clock care to the cows, whose spirits, appetite, breath, urine, and stool conditions were closely monitored. Sickness or calf birth would usually require several sleepless nights from their human caretakers, many of whom forged emotional bonds with their four-legged fellow employees of the state-owned farm and compared them to their “pets” or “children” (PCDC 2019, 76–78). In a sense, the inter-species relationship between the humans and cows—both migrants—became a way to fill the void created by the refugees’ experiences of displacement.<sup>2</sup>

Besides providing the refugees with companionship and psychological comforts, the cows on Guangming Farm were the core of an economic system that generated a “double dividend” (*shuangchong hongli*) from both the diaspora and the border. On one hand, with the introduction of the household responsibility system under reform, many local rural collectives in Shenzhen enthusiastically engaged in export-oriented agricultural production to increase individual incomes. However, they lacked the strong financial and policy support that the state authorities provided to Guangming. Conversely, while other overseas Chinese farms were also recipients of similar aid programs from the government, many farms were in remote locations, and the lack of transportation infrastructure restricted their developmental potential. Across the overseas Chinese farms in China, the returnees of Guangming had, and probably still have, a higher quality of life than most others (Han 2013, 40). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Guangming returnees were entitled to a “frontier subsidy” (*bianfang buzhu*), which was not available to the residents of other overseas



Chinese farms; they also received an additional “returnee subsidy” (*guiqiao buzhu*), which was not available to non-diasporic residents of Shenzhen (PCDC 2019, 183 and 189).

In the early 1980s, with China’s first mechanized milk, pork, and poultry production facilities, Guangming became a recognizable brand in south China and Hong Kong (Du 2020, 113). During the socialist era, the cows were milked by hand, a process that was inefficient and unsafe. Many former dairy workers recalled being injured by the cows. The milk produced by hand could also be easily contaminated, causing it to fail to meet the increasingly rigorous hygiene standards for export to Hong Kong (PCDC 2019, 76). In 1979, through the “compensation trade” model, the Vitasoy Company of Hong Kong provided Guangming with over 1,000 milk cows from New Zealand and a set of advanced milking machinery from Sweden, worth 46 million HKD. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, on average, Guangming exported 10,000–13,000 tons of fresh milk per year to Hong Kong, providing 60–70 percent of all the milk consumed there (PCDC 2019, 205–206 and 209).

In the 1990s, driven by economic growth, consumer demand for milk increased in mainland China. Guangming adopted modern packaging technologies, adapted to the globalization of the soft-drink culture, and successfully expanded its share in the domestic Chinese market. The development of ultra-high-temperature (UHT) processing technology in Sweden in the 1970s offered a golden opportunity for Hong Kong’s Vitasoy Company to market its products as cosmopolitan “soft drink.” The “light, unbreakable, and aseptic” paper packages allowed milk to be stored without refrigeration and carried easily by consumers for picnics and other weekend outings, activities popular among the rising Hong Kong middle class. In Hong Kong, one of the Asian Tigers, Vitasoy-branded UHT soft drinks became a symbol of a modern, outdoor, leisure-oriented urban lifestyle among a generation of residents experiencing an economic boom and developing a distinctive Hong Kong identity (Mak 2021, 57–58). This soft-drink culture also spread across the China–Hong Kong border to Shenzhen. In 1990, Guangming paid off the investment from Vitasoy through compensation trade and became an autonomous business entity, the Shenzhen Chenguang Soft Drink Company (*Shenzhen Chenguang yinliao gongsi*). Besides exporting fresh milk to Hong Kong, Chenguang started to develop new products for the domestic market, including sweetened milk, iced lemon tea, Chinese herbal tea, and jelly in aseptic paper packages. These affordable, convenient, and easily portable soft drinks were popular among school children and young migrant workers in Shenzhen (PCDC 2019, 110).

In the early years of reform, besides investment in milk and soft-drink production, Guangming also took advantage of financing from Southeast Asian Chinese diasporic communities to enable the industrialized production of pigeons and pigs. In 1982, five Indonesian Chinese started a joint venture named “Dabao Pigeon Farm” with Guangming, which on average delivered one million pigeons annually to Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland Chinese markets. Dabao was China’s first and largest standardized meat pigeon production company and “a demonstration base for pollution-free products” (*wu gonghai chanpin shifan jidi*). Roasted pigeon is a delicacy in Cantonese cuisine, and Guangming pigeons enjoyed a great reputation in the Pearl River Delta for their high quality (PCDC 2017, 237). In 1997, Guangming paid off the foreign investment and claimed the entire ownership of the Dabao Pigeon Farm (OCACSZ 2012, 98). Although Guangming pigeons’ market share in Hong Kong was hit hard by the avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak of the same year, in Shenzhen this product remains one of the famous “three treasures of Guangming” (*Guangming sanbao*; the other two are cow colostrum and sweet corn), selling up to 5,000 pieces per day during the holiday season (PCDC 2017, 238).

Foreign investment also transformed pig rearing on Guangming into the industrial-scale production of “Western,” “modern” food items. In 1980, five Filipino Chinese invested \$10 million USD in the Guangdong Overseas Chinese Livestock Joint Venture Company Ltd. (*Guangdong Huaqiao xumu heyang youxian gongsi*) on Guangming Farm (OCACSZ 2012, 97). The company dispatched its managerial staff to Thailand to study the new technologies, and it imported breeding pigs from Belgium and equipment from the United States. Into the mid-1980s, the farm claimed a large share of the burgeoning, high-end market of frozen and processed pork, particularly Western cold cuts, which were exclusively supplied to five-star hotels in Guangzhou and Beijing. The Guangqiao brand ham (“Guangqiao” translates to “Glory to the Overseas Chinese”) was served at a national banquet during Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Beijing in 1987 (PCDC 2019, 39).

In the 1980s to 1990s, the flourishing milk and meat processing industries on the farm provided employment opportunities for some refugees. Despite their relatively low levels of education due to the disruptions caused by war and displacement, they could easily obtain the requisite skills for work on the farm on-site or through short training courses at the UNHCR-sponsored Vocational Training Center. For instance, Xiang Guang, a fourth-generation Vietnamese Chinese who followed his parents to Guangming, did not manage to complete elementary school until age 14 and graduated from junior high school at 23. However, he excelled at the Chenguang milk processing factory and was promoted from an ordinary lane worker to workshop director (PCDC 2019, 169–171). Wu Yuguang, who arrived at Guangming at age 24, obtained an associate degree in business management at the Vocational Training Center and subsequently earned a B.A. degree from a university in Hunan. He later became the vice director of a Hong Kong–Guangming joint-venture vegetable farm (PCDC 2019, 184–185). Refugees such as Xiang and Wu believed that their lives at Guangming turned out better than those of their friends and relatives who stayed in Vietnam or those who migrated to Hong Kong and the West (PCDC 2019, 169–171).

Yet opportunities for upward social mobility in the state farm system favored males over females and those with a high level of literacy in Mandarin Chinese over those who lacked it. Yu Xueping, a woman born in 1948 in the Quảng Ninh Province of Vietnam, was one of the few women with an urban intellectual background. She had completed a degree at a technical secondary school and worked at a bookstore in Vietnam. However, Yu encountered tremendous difficulties upon her arrival at the Guangming farm. Barely speaking any Mandarin and unfamiliar with agricultural labor, Yu would break into tears due to her sense of powerlessness while toiling in the field. In the early 1980s, Yu ventured out of the state economy and started her own business, a breakfast stall. Her operation, known as Yu’s (*Yu Ji*), soon became a local favorite. After 40 years, it is a local institution. Yu had to postpone her retirement plans due to the persistent requests from her loyal customers (Chen 2020; PCDC 2019, 172).

On a farm that boasted a plethora of dairy and meat products, Yu’s appealed to a different niche: cheap, handmade, rice-based dishes with Vietnamese features yet sharing similarities with Cantonese cuisine. Their bestseller was *banh cuon*, the “steamed rice-flour roll,” which resembled the Cantonese *cheung fan*, or *chang fen* in Mandarin. *Cheung fan* is bigger in size and has a larger meat filling, whereas *banh cuon* is smaller and filled with minced meat, carrots, onions, and mushrooms (Chan 2012, 161). Yu’s also had a special dipping sauce—a mix of vinegar, fish sauce, and chopped garlic—that gave the *banh cuon* a distinctive Southeast Asian flavor (PCDC 2017, 214). Foods such as *banh cuon* served as a medium of communication that asserted the returnees’ Southeast Asian identities while strengthening their connections to their descendants and their neighbors in local Cantonese villages, to whom the taste of Southeast Asia was simultaneously familiar and exotic. On the mechanized production lines for milk, pigeon meat, and pork, the returnees achieved

a new socioeconomic status as PRC state employees, but it was at mom-and-pop coffeeshops infused with a Southeast Asian scent that they found their cultural belongings.

### The disappearing farm: 2002 to the present

The food at Yu's served as a source of nostalgia and comfort for the returnees experiencing socioeconomic changes on the shifting territory of Guangming, Shenzhen, and, more generally, post-socialist China. In 1986, as state farm employees, the refugees on Guangming earned an average annual salary of 3,700 RMB, which exceeded that of the nearby villagers (GOGND 2010, 2). However, in 2000, more than 4,500 Guangming residents received a subsistence allowance for low-income groups (*dibao*) from the Shenzhen government (GNDPC 2012, 195). Whereas the peasants from nearby villages envied the returnees at Guangming in the 1980s, the villagers were much better off in the 2000s by comparison.

The reversal in income levels between Guangming and its neighboring villages resulted from changes in the economic structure of Shenzhen, heightened competition in China's dairy industry, and the Chinese government's policy of localizing overseas Chinese farms. In the twenty-first century, Shenzhen's economy has been upgraded from an early reform-era concentration on low-cost, labor-intensive production to encompass capital-intensive fields such as information technology, biotechnology, and renewable energies. As urbanization progressed and the value of land in Shenzhen increased, it became no longer cost-effective for Guangming to continue serving as an agricultural production base. Additionally, with new northern Chinese conglomerates such as Inner Mongolia-based Mengniu and Yili dominating the domestic Chinese dairy market and driving milk prices down, Guangming's profit margin shrank (Mak 2021, 82–83). Meanwhile, top-down financial support for Guangming also dropped. Starting in the mid-1980s, burdened by many insolvent overseas Chinese farms, the central and provincial governments decided to “transfer the responsibility of managing the overseas Chinese state farms to local prefectures, cities, counties or even towns” (Han 2013, 40). With state support and protection no longer available, up to the beginning of the twenty-first century, Guangming still had to bear the high operating cost of its dual function as both an enterprise and a governing body, providing public services such as infrastructure construction and maintenance as well as social welfare services such as pensions and medical care for its employees (GOGND 2010, 6).

In 2002, the half-century-old Guangming Farm ceased to exist. The newly established SOE Guangming Group Ltd. (*Guangmign jituan youxian gongsi*) was relieved of its non-economic functions; the local subdistrict-level government office took over the administrative duties of the dissolved farm. In 2004, in accordance with the Shenzhen government's new urban plan, animal husbandry was relocated from Guangming to the inland city of Huizhou (PCDC 2019, 208). Three years later, the Shenzhen Municipal Government appointed Guangming as a “new district” (*xinqu*), aiming to transform the relatively rural suburb into a future hub for innovative tech companies, particularly those specializing in flat-panel displays and green energies (Vlassenrood 2016, 32). In 2018, Guangming became one of the nine formal administrative divisions (*xingzheng qu*) of Shenzhen.

At the reconstituted Guangming Group, the employment opportunities for the returnees decreased. In 2007, only 40 percent of Guangming Group's employees were returnees themselves or their descendants. Besides the fact that many returnees had reached retirement age, the returnee community also had difficulty meeting the human resource needs of the Guangming Group. Rather than agricultural labor, the SOE now sought managerial and technical professionals and high-end

researchers. The driving engine of the Guangming Group's growth is a pharmaceutical subsidiary, Shenzhen Weiguang Biological Products Co. Ltd. In the early days of the dairy farm, the female calves were raised for milk production, whereas the male calves were used for serum extraction to supply laboratories across China for scientific research. In 1985, the Wuhan Institute of Biological Products and Guangming started Weiguang as a joint venture (PCDC 2019, 272–273). In the 2000s, Weiguang became the largest manufacturer of blood products in Guangdong Province and the largest supplier of hepatitis B and rabies immunoglobulins in China (GP 2008). Today, Weiguang is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

In 2019, the Guangming Group merged with another SOE, the Overseas Chinese Town Enterprises (OCT). The OCT had its origins in the Shahe Farm, a subsidiary of the Guangming Farm located on the west coast of Shenzhen. At the beginning of the reform and opening, the OCAC established the Shahe Overseas Chinese Industrial Zone on what had previously been farmland, hoping to attract foreign investment. China's first Sino–foreign joint-venture enterprise, Guangming Overseas Chinese Electronics Factory, was built in the Shahe Industrial Zone. The factory would later become Konka Group Co. Ltd, one of the leading consumer electronics enterprises in China. Overseas Chinese returnees and their family members were given priority for jobs in the Shahe Industrial Zone. For instance, Vietnamese refugees with experience at Saigon's electronics factories were among the first assembly-line workers at a newly established cassette recorder factory at Shahe (Du 2020, 113). In 1985, the OCAC authorized the Hong Kong–based China Travel Service to develop a 4.6-square-kilometer strip of land carved out of the Shahe Industrial Zone. Luzon-born Filipino Chinese Ye Fei, the only returnee high-ranking general in the PLA and one of the key reformers, gave it the name of “Overseas Chinese Town.” Ye envisioned that the OCT would serve as “a window and a base to attract diasporic capital, technology and talents” (Li 2006, 185–186).

From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, under the leadership of veteran politician Ma Zhimin and based on design work by Singaporean architect Meng Ta Cheang, the OCT evolved from a light-industrial enclave into a tourist resort. Born into an intellectual family in Taishan, a populous coastal county in south China with a long tradition of migration abroad, Ma had rich experiences in urban planning in Shenzhen during the socialist era and became the general manager of the OCT Economic Development Company in 1985. He hired Meng, a Tianjin native with extensive architectural experience in Western Europe and Asia. Ma greatly appreciated Meng's philosophy of maintaining the OCT's historical roots in the diaspora and recreated the OCT as an eco-friendly southern Chinese *qiaoxiang* (native place for the overseas Chinese). Ma is also regarded as the first person to introduce theme parks to China. Inspired by a trip to Madurodam in the Netherlands, Ma proposed to build a similar “miniature China” in Shenzhen. The Splendid China (*jinxiu zhonghua*) theme park and its extension, the China Folk Culture Villages (*minsu wenhua cun*), which opened in 1989 and 1991, respectively, boosted Shenzhen's economy, revived tourism, and helped restore China's international image, which had been tarnished by the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre (Li 2006, 233). The two tourist attractions' popularity peaked in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping came to visit during his Southern Tour. In 1994, the OCT invested 580 million RMB to construct the Window of the World, offering “an around-the-world tour in one day” to members of the rising Chinese middle class who aspired to enjoy leisure but could not yet afford overseas travel (Yang and Xue 2015, 154–157). By the end of the twentieth century, Konka TV sets, Splendid China, the China Folk Culture Villages, and Window of the World had become household names in China and well-known across Southeast Asia (OCTG and China Tourism Press 2001, 4–5).

In the twenty-first century, the OCT has become a conglomerate with hospitality and real-estate development as its key business areas (OCTG 2021). However, in the new OCT-Guangming Group after the merger, the returnees became further marginalized. The OCT holds 51 percent of the shares of the restructured enterprise, while the Guangming District Government holds 49 percent (interviews). Like many other SOEs in contemporary China, despite its ownership structure, the OCT-Guangming Group is a profit-maximizing firm facing intense market competition and has taken on various attributes of private or foreign-funded firms in labor relations (Hurst 2009, 37). Wages at the OCT-Guangming Group are tied to performance; internal competition among employees is fierce. Many returnee employees of the pre-merger Guangming Group found themselves unable to adapt to this new work culture and instead accepted a buyout. Based on their years of employment, bought-out workers were given one-time severance payments, part of which they had to use to purchase their own pension and health insurance (Hurst 2009, 79; interviews). Although the younger former employees of the Guangming Group, generally second- or third-generation returnees, have more opportunities for re-employment, those over age 40 face limited job prospects (interviews).

The returnee community's standard of living declined compared to that of their peasant neighbors as the SOE scaled back its welfare support and as new land regimes emerged on the farm and in the villages. The village collectives adjacent to the former Guangming Farm own their land and possess the right to construct private houses on it, so they can generate significant income from rent. In contrast, the former state farm employees are prevented from doing so because their houses—many of which have not been renovated since the late 1970s or early 1980s—belong to the state (SZNW 2012). In 2010, under pressure from the returnees' collective actions, the Shenzhen Municipal Government approved a compensation scheme. Each returnee household is entitled to purchase 350 square meters of newly built unified construction apartments (*tongjian lou*) at a price much lower than the market rate (GOGND 2010, 1). Although the returnees do benefit from this arrangement, the bigger winner is the state. The settlement has allowed the government to repurpose the rich land resources at Guangming to develop a new high-tech industrial zone at a relatively low cost.

## Conclusions

By “returning” to the PRC and becoming state farm employees, the Vietnamese refugees forged bonds with the Chinese state that both protected and restricted them. Although their arrival coincided with the beginning of reform, socialism persisted on their settlement, Guangming Farm, through the first two decades of reform. Most of the residents were foreign-born, yet the returnee community lived under the protective shell of the Chinese state for a longer period than most of the local population. Although they were engaged in agricultural work, the state granted farm employees welfare benefits that were usually available only to urban residents, placing them in a much more privileged status than Shenzhen's migrant workers.

The welfare that the Vietnamese refugees enjoyed at Guangming did not come for free; the refugees constructed their membership in the state farm through their labor in high-protein food production, most prominently milk, which earned foreign currencies for the state through exporting. However, as Shenzhen graduated from export-oriented processing and compensation trade into the technology sectors, it became no longer cost-effective to continue agriculture and animal husbandry at Guangming. In addition, burdened by its dual function as an economic enterprise and a social welfare provider, the state farm struggled to achieve financial equilibrium and was ultimately



shut down and restructured into an SOE. Through the dissolution of the farm and the SOE reform that ensued, state-subsidized welfare housing provided the returnees with an economic safety net. However, this arrangement also prevented them from reaping the benefits of the rapid increase of land value as their peasant neighbors did. Although most of the Guangming returnees and their descendants continue to enjoy a higher standard of living than residents of overseas Chinese farms elsewhere in China, few among them or their descendants have achieved the status of managerial elites or technical professionals.

The story of the Guangming returnees complicates our understanding of the relationship between the Chinese diaspora and Deng's reform. Contrary to the common perception of diaspora members as a source of capital and technology that sped up China's reform, the Guangming returnees seemed to slow down marketization. However, their labor and cultural capital were crucial for the farm-transformed SOEs to achieve business success. Today, the OCT-Guangming Group generates significant profits from diaspora-inspired cultural theme parks as well as from the biotechnology that began with experiments using blood drawn from the Guangming Farm's calves. In the urbanization process, the restraints placed on the returnees in private housing construction significantly reduced the state's financial and operating costs as it reconstructed Guangming Farm into an innovation hub. The postponed reform on the overseas Chinese state farm laid the foundation, accumulated the capital, and reserved the precious land resources for the state-led technological upgrade in Shenzhen. To use Deng Xiaoping's analogy between China's reform to a river crossing, Guangming's "returned" diaspora are the ferry operators who helped push the vessel from the shore.

## Notes

1. I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
2. I thank Aditya Balasubramanian for pointing this out to me.

## Notes on contributor

**Taomo Zhou** is an Associate Professor of History at Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Her first book, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia and the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2019), won a *Foreign Affairs* "Best Books of 2020" award and an Honorable Mention for the 2021 Harry J. Benda Prize from the Association for Asian Studies. Taomo is currently working on her second book project tentatively entitled "Made in Shenzhen: A Global History of China's First Special Economic Zone," which is under advance contract with Stanford University Press.

## References

- Amrith, Sunil S. 2011. *Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anderson, E. N. 1988. *The Food of China*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Campbell, Stephen. 2018. *Border Capitalism, Disrupted: Precarity and Struggle in a Southeast Asian Industrial Zone*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Carroll, John Mark. 2007. *A Concise History of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Chan, Yuk Wah. 2012. "Banh Cuon and Cheung Fan: Searching for the Identity of the 'Steamed Rice-Flour Roll.'" In *In Chinese Food and Foodways in Southeast Asia and Beyond*, edited by Tan Chee-Beng, 156–174. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Chang, Pao-min. 1982. "The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over the Ethnic Chinese." *The China Quarterly* 90: 195–230. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574100000031X>.



- Chen, Xiangming. 1995. "The Evolution of Free Economic Zones and the Recent Development of Cross-National Growth Zones." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 19 (4): 593–621. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1995.tb00530.x>.
- Chen, Yin 陈瑛. 2020. "归侨光明路" [The Returnees' Path at Guangming]. <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/I9Hb5-283AGdauSpowPgUQ>.
- Du, Juan. 2020. *The Shenzhen Experiment: The Story of China's Instant City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- GNDPC (Guangming New District Party Committee) 光明新区党工委. 2012. 绿色新城, 光明之路—深圳市光明新区五年发展历程 [Green New City, the Path of Guangming—Five Years of Development of the Guangming New District, Shenzhen]. Shenzhen: 深圳报业集团出版社 [Shenzhen News Group Publishing].
- GOGND (Guangming Office, Guangming New District, Shenzhen City) 深圳市光明新区光明办事处. 2010. 光明归侨30年 [Thirty Years of Guangming Returnees]. Unpublished material at the Guangming New District Library, Shenzhen.
- GP (Guangming Group) 光明集团. 2008. 光明集团辉煌50年 [50 Years of Glory of the Guangming Group]. Unpublished material at the Guangming New District Library, Shenzhen.
- Han, Xiaorong. 2013. "The Demise of China's Overseas Chinese State Farms." *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 9 (1): 33–58. <https://doi.org/10.1163/17932548-12341248>.
- Han, Xiaorong. 2014. "From Resettlement to Rights Protection: The Collective Actions of the Refugees from Vietnam in China Since the Late 1970s." *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 10 (2): 197–219. <https://doi.org/10.1163/17932548-12341281>.
- Ho, Elaine Lynn-Ee. 2018. *Citizens in Motion: Emigration, Immigration, and Remigration Across China's Borders*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hu, Xiaoquan. 2020. "'A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation': Law, Development, and China's Dairy Tale." *Journal of Food Law & Policy* 16 (1): 78–135.
- Hurst, William. 2009. *The Chinese Worker after Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kong, Jiequn. 孔结群. 2008. 重建家园: 在祖国不在家乡 [Rebuilding Homes in the Motherland but Not in the Ancestral Places]. M.A. Thesis. Jinan University.
- Li, Jie. 李杰. 2006. 生命没有空白 [A Life Without Blank Space]. Beijing: 光明日报出版社 [Guangming Daily Press].
- Mak, Veronica S. W. 2021. *Milk Craze: Body, Science, and Hope in China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Mark, Chi-Kwan. 2007. "The 'Problem of People': British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949–62." *Modern Asian Studies* 41 (6): 1145–1181. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X06002666>.
- Neveling, Patrick. 2015. "Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones, and the Long March of Capitalist Development Policies During the Cold War." In *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence*, edited by Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, 63–84. London: Bloomsbury.
- Nonini, Donald M., and Aihwa Ong. 1997. "Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative Modernity." In *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, 3–33. Abingdon: Routledge.
- OCACSZ (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Shenzhen Municipal Government) 深圳市人民政府侨务办公室. 2012. 深圳侨务史志 [Historical Records of Overseas Chinese Affairs in Shenzhen]. Shenzhen: 深圳出版发行集团海天出版社 [Shenzhen Publishing Group Haitian Publishing House].
- OCTG (Overseas Chinese Town Group) 华侨城集团. 2021. 华侨城在中国 [Overseas Chinese Town in People's Republic of China]. <https://www.chinaoct.com/hqc/gyhq/hqczzg/index.html>.
- OCTG (Overseas Chinese Town Group) 华侨城集团公司. 2001. 深圳特区华侨城 [OCT Paradise, Shenzhen, People's Republic of China]. Beijing: 中国旅游出版社 [China Tourism Press].
- Ong, Aihwa. 1997. "Chinese Modernities: Narratives of Nation and of Capitalism." In *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, 171–202. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2000. "Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia." *Theory, Culture & Society* 17 (4): 55–75. <https://doi.org/10.1177/02632760022051310>.

- PCDC (Public Cultural Development Center, Guangming District, Shenzhen City) 深圳市光明区公共文化艺术发展中心. 2017. 寻找光明记忆: 新城旧事 [In Search of Memories of Guangming: The Past of a New City]. Shenzhen: 深圳报业集团出版社 [Shenzhen News Group Publishing].
- PCDC (Public Cultural Development Center, Guangming District, Shenzhen City) 深圳市光明区公共文化艺术发展中心. 2019. 寻找光明记忆: 农场往事 [In Search of Memories of Guangming: The Past Events on the Farm]. Shenzhen: 深圳报业集团出版社 [Shenzhen News Group Publishing].
- Peterson, Glen. 2011. *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Quinn-Judge, Sophie. 2006. "Chronology of the Hoa Refugee Crisis in Vietnam." In *The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79*, edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, 234-237. Abingdon: Routledge.
- RROGM (Returnee Reception Office, Guangming Overseas Chinese Livestock Farm, Guangdong Province) 广东省国营光明华侨畜牧场接侨办. 1978a. 1978 年难侨情况汇报 [Report on the Conditions of the Refugee Returnees in 1978]. Unpublished document.
- RROGM (Returnee Reception Office, Guangming Overseas Chinese Livestock Farm, Guangdong Province) 广东省国营光明华侨畜牧场接侨办. 1978b. 难侨调查情况 [Investigation of the Conditions of the Refugee Returnees]. Unpublished document.
- RROGM (Returnee Reception Office, Guangming Overseas Chinese Livestock Farm, Guangdong Province) 广东省国营光明华侨畜牧场接侨办. 1979a. 1979 年侨务工作总结 [Summary of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Work in 1979]. Unpublished document.
- RROGM (Returnee Reception Office, Guangming Overseas Chinese Livestock Farm, Guangdong Province) 广东省国营光明华侨畜牧场接侨办. 1979b. 1979 年光明侨场难侨安置教育情况汇报 [Report on the Settlement and Education Situation of Refugee Returnees on the Guangming Overseas Chinese Farm in 1979]. Unpublished document.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: Why Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Smart, Alan, and Josephine Smart. 2001. "Local Citizenship: Welfare Reform Urban/Rural Status, and Exclusion in China." *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 33 (10): 1853-1869. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a3454>.
- Solinger, Dorothy J. 1999. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Song, Lili. 2018. "China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present, and Potentials." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 37 (2): 139-161. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdy003>.
- SZNV (Shenzhen News Web) 深圳新闻网. 2012. "土地收回不见补偿款; 光明集团职工:14万哪去了?" [Compensation Money Missing after the Land Has Been Claimed; the Employees of the Guangming Group: Where Is the 140,000 RMB Settlement?]. Shenzhen News Web Online, December 17. <https://sz.house.qq.com/a/20121217/000023.htm>.
- Thomas, Mand. 2004. "Transitions in Taste in Vietnam and the Diaspora." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 15 (1): 54-67. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1835-9310.2004.tb00365.x>.
- Vlassenrood, Linda. 2016. "Chinese Urbanization Through the Lens of Guangming New Town." In *Shenzhen: From Factory of the World to World City*, edited by Linda Vlassenrood, 28-43. Rotterdam: Nai010.
- Vosko, Leah. 2010. *Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and International Regulation of Precarious Employment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yang, Chao, and Hua Xue 杨超, 薛晔. 2015. "华侨城与两任领导的梦想" [Dreams of Two Generations of Leaders of the Overseas Chinese Town]. In *深圳改革开放实录* [A Record of Reform in Shenzhen], edited by 深圳市史志办公室 [Shenzhen Municipal Government Records Compilation Office] vol. 1: 148-172.
- Zhang, Chenchen. 2018. "Governing Neoliberal Authoritarian Citizenship: Theorizing *Hukou* and the Changing Mobility Regime in China." *Citizenship Studies* 22 (8): 855-881. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1531824>.
- Zhou, Taomo. 2021. "Leveraging Liminality: The Border Town of Bao'an (Shenzhen) and the Origins of China's Reform and Opening." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80 (2): 337-361. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911821000012>.