If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood. – Arthur Schopenhauer

This page shall deviate slightly from the overall theme of this blog. While this is a blog about ecological antinatalism, this page details an argument about philanthropic antinatalism.

Philanthropic antinatalism is a subtype of antinatalism that posits that we should not have children for philanthropic reasons. That is, choosing not to have a child is the charitable thing to do for this child.

We now get into metaphysical territory — how exactly can we say that something is good for someone if that person doesn’t even exist? Since this is not a blog about metaphysics, and I’m not sure how I feel about the masochism of dealing with metaphysics, let us provisionally take “good for” to refer to something being good for the person in the possible world in which the person exists.

This stuff sounds a lot more complicated than it has to be. Let’s put it this way:

This is Theodore. Theodore presently exists. Because Theodore exists, there are things that are good for Theodore, and things that are bad for Theodore. For instance, ice-cream is good for Theodore. For instance, being hit by a truck is bad for Theodore.

Now, imagine that we have transported to the time that Theodore’s parents were thinking of trying for a baby, but were not yet pregnant with Theodore.

“We should move to an estate with good childcare facilities,” Theodore’s mother opines, considering that a good childcare would be good for Theodore when he is born.

“But first, you should lay off the wine,” his father chimes in. You get the message.

Here, how can Theodore’s parents talk about things that are good, or bad, for Theodore even though Theodore does not yet exist? It’s simple — we imagine that Theodore exists, and contemplate if something is good or bad for him. If something is good for existent-Theodore, we can take it to be good for nonexistent-Theodore. The same applies for things that are bad for him.

This page thus argues that existence is bad for him. By bad for him, it means that the possible world in which he exists is worse-off for him than the possible world in which he does not exist.

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This argument relies on the premise that to exist is to suffer. This is not a novel insight at all. Of course, there are pleasures to be had in existence. Ice-cream, for example, is great. On what basis, then, do I claim that existence is necessarily a harm despite the fact that existence contains within it pleasure?

I now turn to what David Benatar calls the Asymmetry of Pleasure and Pain.

There is a parity between the following:

(1) the presence of pain is bad; and

(2) the presence of pleasure is good.

However, note that this symmetry does not extend to the absence of pleasure and pain. More likely, the disparity can be shown as:

(3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone; and

(4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

This asymmetry is not particularly novel — it explains our intuitions on why we should always opt to avoid bringing suffering into the world, but why there is no duty to bring pleasure into the world.

The upshot of this asymmetry is that the sum total benefit derived from the presence of pain and pleasure in a case of existence is outweighed by the sum total benefit derived from the absence of pain and pleasure in a case of non-existence.

Philanthropic antinatalism is the thesis that we should not birth children because it is worse for them to exist than not to exist. If this asymmetry is true, then, it certainly seems that the better state of affairs is non-existence. It is, also, uncontentious that it is philanthropic to — with our own actions and sometimes at our own cost — bring about a better state of affairs for someone else. This asymmetry thus becomes a strong theoretical ally to philanthropic antinatalism; if we are minded to bring about the best states of affairs for those around us, and non-existence is a better state of affairs than existence, then we should be minded to promote non-existence than existence.

This argument does not extend to presently-existing people. A presently-existing person like you and I stand to be harmed greatly from the termination of our existence. This is because we have projects, plans, et cetera for which we shall incur harm if we are deprived of their satisfaction.  Because of this essential detail, the asymmetry does not apply to presently-existing people. The absence of pleasure can, theoretically, be felt by the person whose existence is to be terminated.